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Abstract
We study achievable rates of reliable communication in a power-constrained two-way additive interference channel over the
real alphabet where communication is disrupted by a power-constrained jammer. This models the wireless communication scenario
where two users Alice and Bob, operating in the full duplex mode, wish to exchange messages with each other in the presence
of a jammer, James. Alice and Bob simultaneously transmit their encodings xA and xB over n channel uses. It is assumed that
James can choose his jamming signal s as a noncausal randomized function of xA and xB , and the codebooks used by Alice and
Bob. Alice and Bob observe xA` xB ` s, and must recover each others’ messages reliably. In this article, we provide upper and
lower bounds on the capacity of this channel which match each other and equal 1
2
log
`
1
2
` SNR˘ in the high-SNR regime (where
SNR, signal to noise ratios, is defined as the ratio of the power constraints of the users to the power constraint of the jammer). We
give a code construction based on lattice codes, and derive achievable rates for large SNR. We also present upper bounds based
on two specific attack strategies for James. Along the way, sumset property of lattices for the achievability and general properties
of capacity-achieving codes for memoryless channels for the converse are proved, which might be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our work is motivated by jamming in multiuser wireless channels. Consider two users Alice and Bob who wish to exchange
independent messages (assumed to be uniformly distributed in a set of size 2nR) with each other over the wireless medium.
The communications is disrupted by an adversarial jammer, James, who injects additive noise into the channel. We assume
that all three parties operate in the full-duplex mode, which means that they are able to transmit and receive simultaneously.
Alice and Bob encode their messages into n-length sequences xA and xB with real valued components and are simultaneously
transmitted across the channel. At the same time, James transmits a jamming sequence s. The channel is additive, and each user
gets to observe y “ xA`xB ` s. The goal of the two users is to recover each others’ message reliably from this observation.
The signals transmitted by Alice, Bob and James are required to satisfy quadratic power constraints of nP, nP , and nN
respectively, i.e.,
}xA}2 ď nP, }xB}2 ď nP, }s}2 ď nN.
We assume that James can select his jamming signal s as a noncausal function of z – xA`xB , and also the codebooks/coding
strategies used by Alice and Bob. However, James has no additional information about the messages or the transmitted signals
in addition to that revealed by xA ` xB and the users’ codebooks. We call this the pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way
adversarial channel problem. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The goal is to design sequences of encoders and decoders for Alice and Bob such that the probability of error of decoding
the respective messages is vanishing in n. Here, the randomness is over the encoding processes used by Alice and Bob, as
well as the jamming signal. We say that a rate R is achievable if there exist sequences of codes for which the associated
probabilities of decoding error is vanishing in n, and the capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
In this paper, we give an upper bound on the capacity. We show that reliable communication is impossible for N ě 3P {4.
For N ă 3P {4, we show that the capacity is upper bounded by 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
. We also describe a coding scheme which
shows that for sufficiently large values of P {N , this bound is achievable.
The problem considered in this paper falls under the general setup of arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), introduced
by Blackwell et al. [BBT60]. This framework is a good model for channels where the noise statistics are arbitrary and
unknown, and also where communication is disrupted by active adversaries. Much of the literature has focused on point-to-point
communication where Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and James attempts to jam the transmission. The quadratically
constrained point-to-point AVC (also called the Gaussian AVC) was studied by Blachman [Bla62], who gave upper and lower
bounds on the capacity of the channel under the assumption that James observes a noiseless version of the transmitted codeword
(a.k.a. the omniscient adversary). Later, Hughes and Narayan [HN87], and Csisza´r and Narayan [CN91], studied the problem
with an “oblivious” James, who knows the codebook, but does not see the transmitted codeword. They showed that under an
average probability of error metric, the capacity of the oblivious adversarial channel is equal to 12 log
`
1` PN
˘
when P ą N
and zero otherwise.
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2Successive works have characterized the error exponent of the oblivious Gaussian AVC [TH91], capacity of the oblivious
vector Gaussian AVC [HN88], and the Gaussian AVC with an unlimited amount of shared secret key between Alice and
Bob [SG06]. Sarwate [Sar12], and later Zhang et al. [ZVJS18b] studied the myopic AVC, where James can choose his jamming
vector as a function of the codebooks and a noisy copy of the transmitted signal. A related model was studied by Haddadpour
et al. [HSBJ13], who assumed that James knows the message, but not the exact codeword transmitted by Alice. Game-theoretic
versions of the problems have also been considered in the literature, including the point-to-point case [Me´d97], with multiple
antennas at the transmitter and receiver [BC96], and also the two-sender scenario [SU09]. The list decoding capacity under the
oblivious and omniscient cases were studied by Hosseinigoki and Kosut [HK18] and Zhang and Vatedka [ZV19] respectively.
Multiuser AVCs have received attention only very recently. Multiple access channels with adversarial jamming were studied
in [PS19c], [SBDP19]. The capacity of the relay channel was analyzed in [PS19b], while [PS19a] gave inner and outer bounds
on the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with side information at the encoder.
The work most related to our paper is that on the discrete-alphabet two-way additive channel with an adversarial jammer
which was studied by Jaggi and Langberg [JL17]. They showed that for discrete additive channels over Fq where James’
transmissions must satisfy a Hamming weight constraint of p, the capacity is equal to 1´Hqppq. In other words, James can
do no worse than transmitting random noise. Many of our ideas were inspired by this work, and we will elaborate on this
in the coming sections. However, the conclusions that we can draw about the quadratically constrained case are different. In
particular, the capacity is lower that what we would get if the noise vector were Gaussian. A game-theoretic version of the
quadratically constrained case we study here was studied by McDonald et al. [MAY19].
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR RESULTS AND TECHNIQUES
A. Overview of results
For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, let SNR :“ P {N be the signal-to-noise ratio.
Theorem 1 (Achievability). For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, given any sufficiently small
constant δ ą 0, if SNR ą gpδq for some function g such that gpδq δÑ0ÝÝÝÑ 8, then both users can achieve rate 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘´δ.
That is, CA ě
“
1
2 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘‰`
and CB ě
“
1
2 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘‰`
.
Theorem 2 (Converse). For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, for any sufficiently small constant
δ ą 0, neither of the users can achieve rate larger than 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘ ` δ. That is, CA ď “ 12 log ` 12 ` PN ˘‰` and CB ď“
1
2 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘‰`
.
Corollary 3 (Capacity). For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, given any sufficiently small
constant δ ą 0, if SNR ą gpδq for some function g such that gpδq δÑ0ÝÝÝÑ 8, then CA “ CB “
“
1
2 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘‰`
.
Both our achievability and converse results can be trivially generalized to the asymmetric case, where the transmissions of
Alice and Bob must satisfy
}xA}2 ď nPA, }xB}2 ď nPB ,
James can independently jam the received vectors of Alice and Bob with jamming signals sA and sB which must satisfy
}sA}2 ď nNA, }sB}2 ď nNB .
Here Alice and Bob respectively receive y
A
“ xA ` xB ` sA and yB “ xA ` xB ` sB . For this pPA, PB , NA, NBq
quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, let SNRA :“ PB{NA and SNRB :“ PA{NB be the SNRs of user one
and two, respectively. Then we have
Corollary 4 (Capacity, asymmetric case). For a pPA, PB , NA, NBq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel,
given any sufficiently small constants δ1, δ2 ą 0, if SNRA ą g1pδ1q and SNRB ą g2pδ2q for some functions g1 and g2 such
that g1pδ1q δ1Ñ0ÝÝÝÑ 8 and g2pδ2q δ2Ñ0ÝÝÝÑ 8, then CA “
”
1
2 log
´
PA
PA`PB ` PBNA
¯ı`
and CB “
”
1
2 log
´
PB
PA`PB ` PANB
¯ı`
.
Note that the capacity 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
vanishes when N ě 2P or SNR ď 1{2. Though the capacity theorem indicates that
1
2 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
is the capacity in high-SNR regime, we do not believe that this is tight in all regimes. Our intuition comes from
the following improved converse result. We are able to push the boundary of zero-rate regime inward via certain symmetrization
strategy which we call z-aware symmetrization.
Theorem 5 (Converse). For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, neither of the users can achieve
positive rate if N ą 3P {4, or SNR ă 4{3.
Again, the above theorem can be trivially generalized to the asymmetric case which reads as follows.
Theorem 6 (Converse). For a pPA, PB , NA, NBq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, user one cannot
achieve positive rate if NA ą 2PB`PA4 ; user two cannot achieve positive rate if NB ą 2PA`PB4 .
3B. Overview of proof techniques and related work
Our ideas are inspired by [JL17], which characterized the capacity of the discrete additive two-way channel with a jammer.
They showed that using randomly expurgated linear codebooks for Alice and Bob achieves the symmetric capacity 1´Hqppq,
where Hqppq denotes the q-ary entropy of p. This implies that James can do no worse than transmitting random noise. It was
also observed that neither linear codes nor uniformly random codebooks can achieve the capacity of this channel. Indeed, our
codebook design closely mimics [JL17]: we use randomly expurgated lattice codebooks.
Unlike the discrete case studied in [JL17], the setup we study in this paper poses additional challenges. In our setup, if
the additive noise were random Gaussian with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) N p0, Nq components, then the
capacity is equal to 12 log2
`
1` PN
˘
. However, we give a converse to show that the capacity is in fact strictly below this. An
important observation is that the capacity of the discrete additive adversarial two-way channel is equal to the list decoding
capacity (which also turns out to be the capacity with random noise). Unlike the discrete case, we show that the capacity of
the pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is (for large values of P {N ) strictly above the list decoding
capacity.
1) Proof techniques for upper bound: We provide three separate converse bounds for this problem by providing three attack
strategies for James:
‚ Clearly, if P ď N , then James can transmit a random codeword from Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) codebook chosen independently
of everything else. Over the randomness in the choice of the codeword, Bob (resp. Alice) will then be unable to distinguish
between the codewords transmitted by Alice (resp. Bob) and James. Hence, the capacity is zero.
‚ We can improve this to show that the capacity is zero for P ď 3N{4. James independently selects a random codeword
x1A from Alice’s codebook and transmits ´ 12 pz´x1Aq whenever he has enough power. With high probability (w.h.p.), this
attack vector satisfies the power constraint, and Bob receives 0.5xB ` 0.5pxA ` x1Aq. Bob cannot decide whether xA or
x1A was transmitted, and therefore the probability of error is bounded away from zero.
‚ In the regime when N ď 3P {4, we define a different attack for James. He can transmit s “ ´αz`g, where g „ N p0, γ2Inq
and α, γ are constants that can be optimized over. This instantiates an effective AWGN channel for Bob (resp. Alice)
which implies that the capacity cannot exceed that of this effective AWGN channel. Upon optimizing the constants, we get
that the capacity cannot be any larger than 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
. To prove this, we analyze general properties of the empirical
properties of capacity-achieving codes for the AWGN channel (which we call AWGN-good codes) which we believe are
novel results and might be of independent interest. We show that independent codewords chosen uniformly from any
AWGN-good code are approximately orthogonal with high probability.
2) Proof techniques for lower bound: Let us briefly summarize the main elements of the achievability proof in [JL17]. A
key step used is that even after expurgation, James is sufficiently confused about the transmitted codeword: if CA and CB
are the codebooks obtained by independent random expurgations of the original linear code C, then |CA ` CB | « |CA| and
leaks very little information about the individual codewords to James. As a consequence, James cannot “push” the transmitted
codeword to the nearest codeword in the corresponding codebook. The final step is to show that as long as the original code
is list decodable with small list sizes, the expurgated code is uniquely decodable w.h.p. (over the randomness in the code
expurgation).
Unlike the discrete case, we are not able to prove a matching lower bound on the capacity for all values of P,N . We show
that for sufficiently large P {N , the capacity is C “ 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
. The code for Alice and Bob is obtained by independently
expurgating a lattice code with spherical shaping (to satisfy power constraint). What makes the quadratically constrained case
more challenging than the discrete one is that due to the power constraint, the sum of two codewords leaks information about
the individual codewords. However, if the original lattice code is suitably chosen, then we can show that James is sufficiently
confused. Even then, following the approach in [JL17] gets us to only the list decoding capacity of 12 log
P
N . To improve the
rate, we introduce a proof technique inspired by [ZVJS18a]. We show that for every attack vector that James can instantiate,
the effective decoding region is significantly smaller than Bnpy,?nNq1 w.h.p. (over the randomness in the choice of message).
To prove the lower bound, we show the following results which may be of independent interest:
‚ Given any “good” lattice Λ and the associated lattice codebook C – ΛXBnp0,?nP q, the sum of two independently and
uniformly chosen codewords from C lies in a thin shell of radius ?2nP . We call this the typical sumset of the lattice
code.
‚ For any vector v P Rn, a uniformly chosen codeword from C is almost orthogonal to v. Consequently, two random
codewords are almost orthogonal to each other.
‚ The above points reinforce the idea that codewords from a good lattice code have many properties similar to those chosen
from random Gaussian codebooks.
‚ For any vector in the typical sumset, most pairs of codewords that sum to this vector respectively lie in a thin strip (See
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5a). This implies that given James’ observation, the actual xA (resp. xB) is uniformly distributed in a
thin strip.
1Here Bn pu, rq denotes an n-dimensional Euclidean ball centered around u of radius r.
4‚ As a result of the above property, for every attack vector s that James can instantiate, the effective decoding radius
turns out to be
b
n 2PN2P´N “
b
n N
1´ N2P which is even larger than
?
nN . However, the (effective) decoding ball actually
makes a relatively small intersection with the coding ball with high probability. We show that with high probability, the
average/typical effective decoding radius is
b
n 2PN2PN`N “
b
n N
1` N2P which is smaller than
b
n N
1´ N2P , and actually also
smaller than
?
nN as one would naively assume. We can then use the list decoding argument followed by the analysis
of unique decodability as in [JL17].
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The notational conventions that we follow throughout the paper is fixed in Sec.
IV. Basics on concentration inequalities, high-dimensional geometry, information/coding theory and background on lattices are
provided in Sec. V and Appendix A. We formally define the problem treated in this paper in Sec. VI. In Sec. VII, to motivate
our posterior estimation-style decoding rules, we provide intuition as to why in the high-SNR regime, the capacity turns out
to be 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
, lower than the AWGNpP,Nq channel capacity 12 log
`
1` PN
˘
, higher than the list-decoding capacity
1
2 log
P
N . Sec. VIII contains a full proof of the achievability results. Specifically,
1) Our code construction based on expurgated lattice code is described in Sec. VIII-A;
2) Various error events to be considered in subsequent sections are defined in Sec. VIII-B;
3) In Sec. VIII-C, we prove sumset property of lattices which is useful in the rest of the analysis and might be of independent
interest elsewhere;
4) In Sec. VIII-D, we show that α, the component of s that is parallel to z can be well estimated by the receiver;
5) In Sec. VIII-E, we show that the effective decoding radius can also be well estimated by the receiver;
6) The rate is properly set in Sec. VIII-F;
7) The average effective decoding radius is computed in Sec. VIII-G;
8) Finally, the probability of decoding error is bounded in Sec. VIII-I using McDiarmid’s inequality;
9) Additionally, as a bonus section, in Sec. VIII-J, we provide improved analysis of sumset property which yields bounds
independent of rcovpΛq.
Converse results are proved in Sec. IX. Specifically,
1) The scale-and-babble strategy that yields a tight outer bound in the high-SNR regime is described in Sec. IX-A;
2) The strategy is analyzed in Sec. IX using information inequalities;
3) The bounding procedure of certain term Q (the probability that the scale-and-babble jamming vector violates James’
power constraint) is deferred to Sec. IX-C;
4) Being useful in the converse argument and of independent interest, the proof of an empirical independence property that
is universal to any AWGN capacity-achieving code is further deferred to Sec. IX-D;
5) A symmetrization-type attack strategy which we call z-aware symmetrization is described and analyzed in Sec. IX-E.
The paper is concluded in Sec. X with some final remarks and open questions of future interests.
IV. NOTATION
Conventions. Sets are denoted by capital letters in calligraphic typeface, e.g., C, I, etc. Random variables are denoted by
lower case letters in boldface or capital letters in plain typeface, e.g., m,x, s, U,W , etc. Their realizations are denoted by
corresponding lower case letters in plain typeface, e.g., m,x, s, u, w, etc. Vectors (random or fixed) of length n, where n is
the blocklength without further specification, are denoted by lower case letters with underlines, e.g., x, s, x, s, etc. The i-th
entry of a vector x P Xn is denoted by xpiq since we can alternatively think x as a function from rns to X . Same for a
random vector x. Matrices are denoted by capital letters in boldface, e.g., P,Σ, etc. Similarly, the pi, jq-th entry of a matrix
G P Fnˆm is denoted by Gpi, jq. We sometimes write Gnˆm to explicitly specify its dimension. For square matrices, we
write Gn for short. Letter I is reserved for identity matrix.
Functions. We use the standard Bachmann–Landau (Big-Oh) notation for asymptotics of real-valued functions in positive
integers.
For two real-valued functions fpnq, gpnq in positive integers, we say that fpnq asymptotically equals gpnq, denoted fpnq —
gpnq, if
lim
nÑ8
fpnq
gpnq “ 1.
For instance, 2n`logn — 2n`logn ` 2n, 2n`logn ffi 2n. We write fpnq .“ gpnq (read fpnq dot equals gpnq) if the coefficients
of the dominant terms in the exponents of fpnq and gpnq match,
lim
nÑ8
log fpnq
log gpnq “ 1.
5For instance, 23n .“ 23n`n1{4 , 22n ­ .“ 22n`logn . Note that fpnq — gpnq implies fpnq .“ gpnq, but the converse is not true.
For any q P Rą0, we write logqp¨q for the logarithm to the base q. In particular, let logp¨q and lnp¨q denote logarithms to
the base two and e, respectively.
For any A Ď Ω, the indicator function of A is defined as, for any x P Ω,
1Apxq :“
#
1, x P A
0, x R A .
At times, we will slightly abuse notation by saying that 1A is 1 when event A happens and 0 otherwise. Note that 1Ap¨q “
1t¨ P Au.
Sets. For any two sets A and B with additive and multiplicative structures, let A ` B and A ¨ B denote the Minkowski sum
and Minkowski product of them which are defined as
A` B :“ ta` b : a P A, b P Bu , A ¨ B :“ ta ¨ b : a P A, b P Bu ,
respectively. If A “ txu is a singleton set, we write x` B and x ¨ B for txu ` B and txu ¨ B.
For M P Zą0, we let rM s denote the set of first M positive integers t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Mu.
Geometry. Let }¨}2 denote the Euclidean/L2-norm. Specifically, for any x P Rn,
}x}2 :“
˜
nÿ
i“1
x2i
¸1{2
.
Let Volnp¨q denote the n-dimensional Lebesgue volume of an Euclidean body (set with nonempty interior). Specifically, for
any Euclidean body A Ď Rn,
VolnpAq “
ż
A
dx “
ż
Rn
1Apxq dx,
where dx denotes the differential of x with respect to (w.r.t.) the Lebesgue measure on Rn. For convenience, the subscript for
dimension will be dropped if no confusion will be caused.
An pn´ 1q-dimensional Euclidean sphere centered at x of radius r is denoted by
Sn´1px, rq :“
!
y P Rn : ››y››
2
“ r
)
.
An n-dimensional Euclidean ball centered at x of radius r is denoted by
Bnpx, rq :“
!
y P Rn : ››y››
2
ď r
)
.
We will drop the superscript for dimension when they are clear from the context. When the center of the ball or sphere is not
important, we also drop the first argument.
Let Vn :“ VolnpBnp0, 1qq.
Information theory. We use Hp¨q to interchangeably denote the binary entropy function and the (differential or discrete)
Shannon entropy; the exact meaning will be clear from the context. In particular, if Px : Rn Ñ Rě0 is the p.d.f. of a random
vector x in Rn, Hpxq denotes the differential entropy of x „ Px,
Hpxq “ ´
ż
Rn
Pxpxq logPxpxq dx.
If X is a discrete set, and Px : Xn Ñ r0, 1s is the p.m.f. of a random vector x on Xn, Hpxq denotes the Shannon entropy of
x „ Px,
Hpxq :“
ÿ
xPXn
Pxpxq log 1
Pxpxq .
For any p P r0, 1s, Hppq denotes the binary entropy
Hppq “ p log 1
p
` p1´ pq log 1
1´ p .
The same convention is followed for mutual information.
6V. PRELIMINARIES
Algebraic inequalities.
Fact 7. For any x ě 0, logp1´ xq ď ´x and logp1` xq ď 2x. For any 0 ď x ď 1{2, logp1´ xq ě ´2x. For any 0 ď x ď 1,
logp1` xq ě x.
Fact 8. For any x ě ´1 and L R p0, 1q, p1´ xqL ě 1´ Lx. For any x P r0, 1s and any L P Zě0, p1´ xqL ď 11`Lx .
Corollary 9. For any a, b ě 0, 0 ď ε ď a{2 and δ ě 0, we have
log
a´ ε
b` δ ě log
a
b
´ 2ε
a
´ 2δ
b
.
Proof.
log
a´ ε
b` δ “ logpa´ εq ´ logpb` δq
“ log a` log
´
1´ ε
a
¯
´ log b´ log
ˆ
1` δ
b
˙
ě log a
b
´ 2ε
a
´ 2δ
b
, (V.1)
where Inequality (V.1) follows from Fact 7 since 2ε{a ď 1{2 by assumption.
Probability.
Fact 10. For any events A and E , Pr rAs ď Pr rEs ` Pr rAX Ecs.
Lemma 11 (Markov’s inequality). If X is a nonnegative random variable, then for any a ą 0, Pr rX ě as ď E rXs {a.
Lemma 12 (Chernoff bound). Suppose X1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XN is a sequence of N t0, 1u-valued independent random variables. Let
X :“ řNi“1Xi. Then for any δ P r0, 1s,
Pr rX ě p1` δqE rXss ď exp
ˆ
´δ
2
3
E rXs
˙
,
Pr rX ď p1´ δqE rXss ď exp
ˆ
´δ
2
2
E rXs
˙
,
Pr rX R p1˘ δqE rXss ď2 exp
ˆ
´δ
2
3
E rXs
˙
.
Corollary 13. Suppose a codebook C consists of 2nK (K ą 0) codewords in a set V and W is a subset of V . Let C1 denote
the codebook obtained by independently removing each codeword in C with probability 1´ 2´nγ (γ ă K). Then
Pr
“ˇˇC1 XW ˇˇ R p1˘ 1{2qE “ˇˇC1 XW ˇˇ‰‰ ď2 expˆ´ 1
12
2npK´γq
˙
.
Lemma 14 (Gaussian tail). If g „ N p0, σ2q, then for any δ ě 0, Pr rg ě δs ď exp
´
´ δ22σ2
¯
.
Lemma 15 (χ2 tail). If g „ N p0, σ2Inq, then }g}22 has (scaled) χ2-distribution and
Pr
”››g››2
2
ě nσ2p1` δq
ı
ď exp
ˆ
´δ
2
4
n
˙
,
Pr
”››g››2
2
ď nσ2p1´ δq
ı
ď exp
ˆ
´δ
2
2
n
˙
,
Pr
”››g››2
2
R nσ2p1˘ δq
ı
ď2 exp
ˆ
´δ
2
4
n
˙
.
Lemma 16 (McDiarmid’s inequality). Suppose X1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XN is a sequence of X - valued random variables. Let f : XN Ñ R
be a function. Define the Lipschitz constant of f at the i-th input as
Lipipfq :“ max
x1,¨¨¨ ,xi,x1i,¨¨¨ ,xNPX
ˇˇ
fpx1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xi, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xN q ´ fpx1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , x1i, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xN q
ˇˇ
.
Define the Lipschitz constant of f as
Lippfq :“max
iPrNs
Lipipfq.
7Then we have
Pr rfpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XN q ą p1` δqE rf ss ď exp
˜
´ 2δ
2E rf s2
NLippfq2
¸
,
Pr rfpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XN q ă p1´ δqE rf ss ď exp
˜
´ 2δ
2E rf s2
NLippfq2
¸
,
Pr rfpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XN q R p1˘ δqE rf ss ď2 exp
˜
´ 2δ
2E rf s2
NLippfq2
¸
.
Lemma 17 (First mean value theorem for integrals). Let Ω Ă Rn be a closed set. Let f : Ω Ñ R be a continuous function
and g : Ω Ñ R be a integrable function that does not change sign. Then there exists x P Ω such thatż
Ω
fpξqgpξq dξ “ fpxq
ż
Ω
gpξq dξ.
Geometry.
Fact 18. Vn´1Vn —
a
n
2pi .
Fact 19. VolpBn prqq “ Vnrn and Vn — 1?pin p2pie{nqn{2.
The following lemma can be used to estimate the number of lattice points in any convex body, whose proof is along the
lines of [OE16].
Lemma 20. For any body K Ă Rn and a lattice Λ, the number of lattice point in K is upper and lower bounded by
VolpqKq
VolpΛq ď |ΛXK| ď
VolppKq
VolpΛq ,
where qK :“tx P K : dpx, BKq ě rcovpΛqu ,pK :“K ` VpΛq.
Lemma 21. Let Λ0 ď Rn be a full rank lattice. Then for any y P Rn and any r ą rcovpΛ0q{q,
1
qn
ˇˇˇˇ
1
q
Λ0 X Bnpy, rq
ˇˇˇˇ
P
ˆ
r
reffpΛ0q
˙nˆ
1˘ rcovpΛ0q
qr
˙n
.
Lemma 22. Let Λ be a full rank lattice in Rn. Let V be a convex body and W be a convex subset of V . Assume VolpqVq ą 0
and Volp|Wq ą 0. Independently remove each lattice point in Λ with probability 1 ´ 2´nγ and let Λ1 denote the resulting
configuration. Let x be a lattice point uniformly distributed on Λ1 X V . Then
Pr
Λ1
«
Pr
x„Λ1XV rx PWs ą 3
VolpxWq
VolpqVq
ff
ď exp
˜
´2
´nγ
12
Volp|Wq
VolpΛq
¸
` exp
˜
´2
´nγ
12
VolpqVq
VolpΛq
¸
.
Proof.
Pr
Λ1
«
Pr
x„Λ1XV rx PWs ą 3
VolpxWq
VolpqVq
ff
“Pr
Λ1
«
|Λ1 XW|
|Λ1 X V| ą 3
VolpxWq
VolpqVq
ff
ďPr
Λ1
«ˇˇ
Λ1 XW ˇˇ ą 3
2
2´nγ
VolpxWq
VolpΛq
ff
` Pr
Λ1
«ˇˇ
Λ1 X V ˇˇ ă 1
2
2´nγ
VolpqVq
VolpΛq
ff
ďPr
Λ1
„ˇˇ
Λ1 XW ˇˇ ą 3
2
2´nγ |ΛXW|

` Pr
Λ1
„ˇˇ
Λ1 X V ˇˇ ă 1
2
2´nγ |ΛX V|

(V.2)
ď exp
ˆ
´2
´nγ
12
|ΛXW|
˙
` exp
ˆ
´2
´nγ
12
|ΛX V|
˙
(V.3)
ď exp
˜
´2
´nγ
12
Volp|Wq
VolpΛq
¸
` exp
˜
´2
´nγ
12
VolpqVq
VolpΛq
¸
, (V.4)
where Inequality (V.3) follows from Corollary 13 by noting that
E
Λ1
“ˇˇ
Λ1 XW ˇˇ‰ “2´nγ |ΛXW| , E
Λ1
“ˇˇ
Λ1 X V ˇˇ‰ “ 2´nγ |ΛX V| .
8Inequalities (V.2) and (V.4) are by Lemma 20.
Information theory. The following inequalities are standard in information theory.
Lemma 23 (Cardinality bound). If X is a random variable distributed on a finite set X , then HpXq ď log |X |.
Lemma 24 (Entropy vs. variance bound). If X is a real-valued random variable, then HpXq ď 12 logp2pieVar rXsq.
Lemma 25 (Fano’s inequality). If X Ñ Y Ñ pX is a Markov chain where X is distributed on r2nRs, then HpX|Y q ď
HpX| pXq ď 1` Pr ” pX ‰ XınR.
Lemma 26 (Data processing inequality). If X Ø Y Ø Z form a Markov chain, then IpX;Zq ď IpY ;Zq.
Definition 1 (Quadratically constrained myopic adversarial channel). A pP, σ2, Nq-quadratically constrained myopic adversarial
channel takes as input xm which encodes m PM subject to power constraint }x}2 ď
?
nP . The transmitted codeword x is
also broadcast through a AWGNpP, σ2q channel and James receives z “ x ` sz where sz „ N p0, σ2Inq. Based on z and
the codebook C “ txmumPM (which is known to every party), James designs an adversarial noise vector s subject to power
constrant }s}2 ď
?
nN . Once s is transmitted, the channel adds it to x and outputs y “ x` s P Bn `0,?nP `?nN˘. Bob
receiving y is required to reliably decode to the message corresponding to s.
Definition 2 (List decodability of Euclidean codes). A code C “ txiuiPM Ď Rn is said to be pP,N,Lq-list decodable for
some P,N ą 0 and L P Zą0 if }xi}2 ď
?
nP for every i PM and for any y P Rn, ˇˇC X Bn `y,?nN˘ˇˇ ď L.
Definition 3 (List decodability of infinite lattices). An infinite lattice Λ ď Rn is said to be pN,Lq-list decodable for some
N ą 0 and L P Zą0 if for every y P Rn,
ˇˇ
ΛX Bn `y,?nN˘ˇˇ ď L.
Definition 4 (Normalized logarithmic density). Let Λ ď Rn be an infinite lattice. The density of Λ is defined as
∆pΛq– lim sup
nÑ8
|ΛX r0, aqn|
an
.
With slight abuse of notation, the normalized logarithmic density (NLD) of Λ is defined as RpΛq– 1n log ∆pΛq. NLD measure
the “rate” of a lattice.
VI. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This paper is concerned with the following communication scenario. Two transmitters Alice and Bob want to exchange
their messages mA and mB over a noisy channel governed by an adversary James. Specifically, we assume mA and mB are
uniformly distributed in Alice’s and Bob’s message sets M and W , respectively. To fight against the adversarial noise to be
introduced by James, Alice encodes her message into a length-n real-valued vector xA :“ xmA satisfying }xA}2 ď
?
nPA
for some channel parameter PA ą 0. Similarly, Bob is allowed to encode his message into a codeword xB :“ xmB satisfying}xB}2 ď
?
nPB for some PB ą 0. By Kerckhoffs’s principle, we assume that codebooks (collection of codewords) used by
Alice and Bob are known to every party in the system. Codewords xA and xB are transmitted and added in the channel.
James gets to know the sum z :“ xA ` xB . Based on his observation, James designs adversarial vectors sA and sB such that
}sA}2 ď
?
nNA and }sB}2 ď
?
nNB for some NA ą 0 and NB ą 0, respectively. Once sA and sB are fed into the channel,
Alice receives y
A
:“ z`sA and Bob receives yB :“ z`sB . The goal for Alice/Bob is to reliably decode the other transmitter
Bob’s/Alice’s message w.h.p. over mA and mB .
The channel model is depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: A quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel. In our proof, we assume PA “ PB “ P and NA “ NB “ N .
All of our results can be easily extended to the general asymmetric case.
9Definition 5 (Quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel). A pPA, PB , NA, NBq-quadratically constrained two-way
adversarial channel is a function pair pWA,WBq,
WA : Bn
`
0,
?
nPA
˘ˆ Bn `0,?nPB˘ˆ Bn `0,?nNA˘ Ñ Bn `0,?nPA `?nPB `?nNA˘
pxA, xB , sAq ÞÑ yA :“ xA ` xB ` sA
,
WB : Bn
`
0,
?
nPA
˘ˆ Bn `0,?nPB˘ˆ Bn `0,?nNB˘ Ñ Bn `0,?nPA `?nPB `?nNB˘
pxA, xB , sBq ÞÑ yB :“ xA ` xB ` sB
.
Here sA and sB are outputs of an arbitrary jamming map pair pJamA, JamBq of the following form,
JamA,CA,CB : CA ` CB Ñ Bn
`
0,
?
nNA
˘
z ÞÑ sA ,
JamB,CA,CB : CA ` CB Ñ Bn
`
0,
?
nNB
˘
z ÞÑ sB .
Note that both JamA and JamB can depend on pCA, CBq.
Remark 1. Throughout this paper, we focus on the symmetric case where PA “ PB “ P and NA “ NB “ N . Such channels
are denoted by pP,Nq-quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channels for short. All results can be trivially extended
to the asymmetric case. We will state the extension without proof.
Definition 6 (Code). A code pEncA,EncB ,DecA,DecBq consists of
‚ Alice’s encoder
EncA : M Ñ Bn
`
0,
?
nPA
˘
m ÞÑ xA,m ;
‚ Bob’s encoder
EncB : W Ñ Bn
`
0,
?
nPB
˘
w ÞÑ xB,w ;
‚ Alice’s decoder
DecA : Bn
`
0,
?
nPA `?nPB `?nNA
˘ Ñ W
y
A
ÞÑ pw ;
‚ Bob’s decoder
DecB : Bn
`
0,
?
nPA `?nPB `?nNB
˘ Ñ W
y
B
ÞÑ pm .
The dimension n is called the blocklength of the code.
Let M :“ |M| and W :“ |W|. The message sets M and W are identified with rM s and rW s, respectively. The rate of a
code pCA, CBq is defined as a pair pRA, RBq where RA “ RpCAq :“ logMn and RB “ RpCBq :“ logWn .
At times, we also abuse the notation and call the collection of codewords (images of the encoding maps) codebooks, i.e.,
CA :“
 
xA,m
(M
m“1, and CB :“
 
xB,w
(W
w“1.
Definition 7 (Average probability of error). The average probability of error of a codebook pair pCA, CBq associated with
pEncA,EncB ,DecA,DecBq used over a pPA, PB , NA, NBq-quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is defined
as
Pe,ApCA, CBq :“ max
JamA,CA,CB
Pr
mA„M
mB„W
“
DecA
`
xA,mA ` xB,mB ` JamA,CA,CB pxA,mA ` xB,mB q
˘ ‰ mB‰
“ max
JamA,CA,CB
1
MW
ÿ
mAPM
ˇˇ 
mB PW : DecA
`
xA,mA ` xB,mB ` JamA,CA,CB pxA,mA ` xB,mB q
˘ ‰ mB(ˇˇ ,
Pe,BpCA, CBq :“ max
JamB,CA,CB
Pr
mA„M
mB„W
“
DecB
`
xA,mA ` xB,mB ` JamB,CA,CB pxA,mA ` xB,mB q
˘ ‰ mA‰
“ max
JamB,CA,CB
1
MW
ÿ
mBPW
ˇˇ 
mA PM : DecB
`
xA,mA ` xB,mB ` JamB,CA,CB pxA,mA ` xB,mB q
˘ ‰ mA(ˇˇ ,
where the probabilities are taken over uniform selection of mA and mB .
Definition 8 (Achievable rate). A rate pair pRA, RBq is said to be achievable if for any constant β1, β2 ą 0 and ε1, ε2 ą 0,
there exists a sequence of codes tpCA,n, CB,nqun for infinitely many n such that, there is an n0, for every n ą n0,
‚ RA,n ě RA ´ β1 and RB,n ě RB ´ β2;
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‚ the probabilities of Alice’s and Bob’s decoding errors vanish in n,
Pe,ApCA,n, CB,nq ďε1,
Pe,BpCA,n, CB,nq ďε2.
Definition 9 (Capacity). The capacity pCA, CBq of a pPA, PB , NA, NBq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel
is defined as the supremum of all achievable rates,
CA :“ lim sup
ε1Ó0,ε2Ó0
lim sup
nÒ8
max
CA,nĂBnp0,?nPAq
CB,nĂBnp0,?nPBq
Pe,ApCA,n,CB,nqďε1
Pe,BpCA,n,CB,nqďε2
RpCA,nq,
CB :“ lim sup
ε1Ó0,ε2Ó0
lim sup
nÒ8
max
CA,nĂBnp0,?nPAq
CB,nĂBnp0,?nPBq
Pe,ApCA,n,CB,nqďε1
Pe,BpCA,n,CB,nqďε2
RpCB,nq.
VII. BEYOND LIST DECODING CAPACITY: MODIFIED DECODING RULES
Naively following the proof strategy in [JL17], we cannot prove any achievable rate that is larger than the list decoding
capacity 12 log
P
N above which the list size of any code has to be exponential in the blocklength n.
A. Decoding rule (informal)
Bob computes
pα–1´ xyB ,xBy
nP
,ry
B
–y
B
´ p1´ pαqxB ,
rdec –
›››y
B
›››2
2
´ 2p1´ pαqAy
B
,xB
E
.
If there is a single codeword
xA P CA X 1p1´ pαqBnpryB , rdecq,
then the decoder outputs the message associated to xA. Otherwise, it declares an error. Alice’s decoder operates likewise.
B. Intuition
We provide intuition behind our posterior-estimation-style decoding rule. All slack factors will be omitted in the rough
calculations in this section.
Before proceeding, we would like to remind the readers of a fact from high dimensional geometry: as long as the rcovpΛq is
sufficiently small, a random lattice point in a ball is concentrated near the surface of the ball and is approximately orthogonal
to any given vector.
Suppose a random pair of xA and xB is transmitted. They are concentrated in a thin shell near the sphere Sn´1p0,
?
nP q
and are almost orthogonal with high probability. Consider Bob trying to decode. Alice’s decoding rule is symmetric. Bob
receives y
B
“ xA ` xB ` sB . From James’ view, he observes z “ xA ` xB which has norm about
?
2nP w.h.p. There is a
large number of pairs of pxA,xBq which sums up to z. Moreover, each pair is approximately orthogonal and each of xA and
xB is approximately uniformly distributed in a thin strip of radius
a
nP {2 perpendicular to z. James’ jamming vector can be
generically decomposed into directions parallel and perpendicular to z,
sB “ ´αz` sK “ ´αpxA ` xBq ` sK,
where sK “ projzKpsBq is orthogonal to z. He has to choose α so that sB does not violate his power constraint,
}´αxA ´ αxB ` sK}22 « 2α2nP ` }sK}22 ď nN.
This imposes a constrain on α: |α| ď
b
N
2P . Under this decomposition, Bob’s received word can be written as yB –
p1´αqxA` p1´αqxB ` sK. From James’ view, if z is typical (i.e., }z}2 P
a
2α2P p1˘ δq), there is a large number of pairs
of codewords pxA,xBq that were potentially transmitted (i.e., xA ` xB “ z). Furthermore, these codewords are uniformly
11
distributed in a thin strip T near the surface of Bn `0,?nP ˘, orthogonal to z, of radius approximately anP {2. (See Fig. 8a
for the geometry.) Hence the value ofA
y
B
,xB
E
“ xp1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK,xBy
is well concentrated around
0` p1´ αq }xB}22 ` 0 « p1´ αqnP
w.h.p. over message selection. Thereby the value of α that was chosen by James can be well estimated by Bob via estimatorpα :“ 1´ xyB ,xBynP . Then Bob computes yB ´ p1´ pαqxB which in turn well approximates p1´ αqxA ` sK. We now observe
that, once James receives z and instantiates his jamming vector s based on z, the effective channel to Bob is essentiallyry
B
“ rxA ` sK where sK is fixed, rxA – p1 ´ αqxA and xA is uniformly distributed in the strip T X CA. It turns out that
xA and sK are almost orthogonal w.h.p. Let rP :“ p1 ´ αq2P . Assuming James used up all his power (which is the worst
case for Bob), let rN :“ N ´ 2α2P . For any A Ă Rn, let rA denote p1 ´ αqA. One can compute the typical radius of the
decoding region induced by rxA P rT X rCA under the translation of sK, which turns out to be approximately bn rPĂNrP`ĂN . Now
invoking techniques in [JL17] allows us to show that as long as rΛ is p rN,Lq list-decodable with constant (independent of
n) list size L, then CA is uniquely decodable with probability 1 ´ 2´2Ωpnq over expurgation. Hence the p rP , rNq-list-decoding
capacity 12 log
´ rPrPĂN{p rP`ĂNq¯ “ 12 log ´1` rPĂN ¯ can be achieved. Minimizing over James’ choice of α subject to |α| ď b N2P
gives that under the worst jamming strategy that James can impose, the rate 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
can be achieved. (The maximizer
α˚ turns out to be N2P .) This optimization problem coincides with the one that shows up in our converse.
C. Some remarks
1) We assume N ă P (otherwise the capacity is obviously 0). Hence α ď
b
N
2P ď
a
1{2 ă 1.
2) Let us examine what Bob gains by running the above decoder. Consider the worst channel to Bob that James could
instantiate, which, in hindsight, corresponds to α being α˚ – N2P . The original channel is yB “ xA ` xB ` sB . Naively
cancelling his signal xB , Bob gets rryB – xA ` sB . Being over-pessimistic and assuming worst-case sB , one would
expect the SNR to be ĆSNR– P {N and only 12 log PN (which coincides with the pP,Nq-list-decoding capacity) could be
achieved. However, by running the above decoder, Bob in fact gets the effective channel
ry
B
– rxA ` sK “ p1´ α˚qxA ` sK “ 2P ´N2P xA ` sK.
Scaling everything back by 11´α˚ , Bob gets xA ` 2P2P´N sK. Note that sK typically has power
rN – N ´ 2α2˚P “ Np2P ´Nq2P .
The effective SNR is hence ĆSNR “ P´
2P
2P´N
¯2 rN “
P
N
´ 1
2
ă P
N
.
At this point, it seems that our reduction can only lead to achievable rate 12 log
ĆSNR “ 12 log ` PN ´ 12˘, which is, somewhat
counterintuitively, even less than the naive 12 log
P
N . However, it turns out that though sK comes from an adversarial noise
sB , Bob can actually achieve
1
2 log
´
1`ĆSNR¯, as if sK was a Gaussian of the same variance. The miracle is essentially
due to the fact that James only gets to observe z, rather than individual signals xA and xB . As a consequence of measure
concentration, the average/typical effective decoding radius sK has much lower power:
N –
rP rNrP ` rN “ Np2P ´Nq
2
2P p2P `Nq ,
where rP – p1´ α˚q2P “ p2P ´Nq2
4P
.
Therefore the average/typical effective SNR is
SNR–
P´
2P
2P´N
¯2
N
“ P
N
` 1
2
ą P
N
.
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Now Bob is in a good shape and he could transmit at the
ˆ
P,
´
2P
2P´N
¯2
N
˙
-list-decoding capacity:
1
2
log SNR “ 1
2
log
´
1`ĆSNR¯ “ 1
2
log
ˆ
1
2
` P
N
˙
ą 1
2
log
P
N
.
3) In [JL17], it is claimed that when R ą 1{2, random codes also achieve capacity. This is not true for the quadratically
constrained case. No matter how large the SNR is, we cannot use a random spherical/ball code. We have to use codes
with linear structures. This is because if codewords are independently and uniformly distributed in Bn `0,?nP ˘, then
given z “ x1 ` x2, with probability 1, px1,x2q is the unique pair of codewords that sum up to z. Then James knows x1
and x2 and is hence omniscient.
4) In general, suppose that Alice and Bob have power constraints PA and PB , respectively, and the noise vectors to them are
subject to power constraints NA and NB , respectively. Assume that NB ă PA`PB , otherwise CA “ CB “ 0, obviously.
Consider Bob. Following exactly the same proof, in the high-SNR regime, the rate given by the following optimization
can be achieved.
maximize 12 log
´
1` p1´α2qPANB´α2pPA`PBq
¯
subject to 0 ď α ď
b
NB
PA`PB .
Solving it, we have the maximizer α˚ “ NBPA`PB and the maxima is
CB “1
2
log
ˆ
PB
PA ` PB `
PA
NB
˙
.
Exactly the same optimization also shows up in the scale-and-babble converse. Hence the above expression is the capacity
of user Bob in the high-SNR regime.
Similarly, if we consider Alice, by the same calculations, we get the capacity for user Alice
CA “1
2
log
ˆ
PA
PA ` PB `
PB
NA
˙
.
VIII. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Code design
Let Λ be a lattice obtained by lifting random linear codes C1 over Fq via Construction-A. Specifically, let G „ Fnˆkq be a
uniformly ranodm matrix. The field size q and dimension k will be fixed later. Define the random linear code generated by G
as C1 “ GFkq . Define Λ “ 1qΦpC1q ` Zn, where Φ: Fq Ñ Z is the natural embedding which maps any field element j P Fq to
an integer j P Z. One can easily check that Λ is indeed a lattice. Our lattice code is finally defined as C :“ ΛXBn `0,?nP ˘.
It was proved in [ELZ05] that the above ensemble of lattices is good for covering w.h.p.
Lemma 27 (Theorem 2, [ELZ05]). Let Λ be a lattice randomly drawn from the ensemble defined above whose parameters
are restricted as follows. Let q and k be such that
qk “ 1Bn preffpΛqq —
?
npi
ˆ
n
2pireffpΛq2
˙n{2
.
Fix reffpΛq to a constant. Let k ď p1´ cqn for some constant c P p0, 1q and k “ ωplog2 nq. This in turn imposes constraints
on q, q “ ωp?nq and log q “ opn{ log nq. Define dpnq :“
?
n
2q . Then Λ is good for covering w.h.p.,
Pr
G
„
rcovpΛq
reffpΛq ď fpnq

ěp1´ 2´νpnqqp1´ 2´νpnq`1qlogn`log log q, (VIII.1)
where fpnq ą 1 is defined as
fpnq :“
ˆ
rcovpΛq
rcovpΛq ´ 2dpnq
˙
nλ{n2plogn`log log q`1q
log q
n ,
for some fixed constant λ ą 0; in the RHS of Eqn. (VIII.1), νpnq is defined as
νpnq :“2 logplog n` log log qq.
Remark 2. As n approaches infinity, by the choice of dpnq nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0, for any constant λ ą 0 and by the choice of q, respectively,
we have
rcovpΛq
rcovpΛq ´ 2dpnq Ñ1,
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nλ{n Ñ1,
2plogn`log log q`1q
log q
n Ñ1.
Hence fpnq nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1. That is, rcovpΛq{reffpΛq “ 1` onp1q and Λ is good for covering. Also, note that, by the choice of νpnq
and p, the RHS of Eqn. (VIII.1) approaches 1 from left as nÑ8,
p1´ 2´νpnqqp1´ 2´νpnq`1qlogn`log log q Ñ1.
Hence the covering goodness property holds w.h.p.
Remark 3. Under the above choices of parameters, there are superexponentially many lattice points in the unit cube r0, 1sn
(and any of its integer translation r0, 1sn ` a where a P Zn). For the purpose of coding, it is desirable to have exponentially
many lattice points to keep the rate fixed. Indeed, we will scale Λ properly momentarily.
For the convenience of future calculations, define rcovpΛq :“ ?nω and reffpΛq :“ ?nτ .
Scale Λ properly so that ˇˇˇ
ΛX Bn
´
0,
?
nP
¯ˇˇˇ
ě2 12 logp 12` PN q´β0 , (VIII.2)
where β0 :“ β ` β2 ` β3 and β, β2, β3 will be defined in Sec. VIII-F (see Eqn. (VIII.53), (VIII.54) and (VIII.55)). Sinceˇˇˇ
ΛX Bn
´
0,
?
nP
¯ˇˇˇ
ěB
n
`
0,
?
nP ´ rcovpΛq
˘
Bn preffpΛqq
“
˜?
nP ´ rcovpΛq
reffpΛq
¸n
“
˜c
P
τ
´
c
ω
τ
¸n
, (VIII.3)
the above requirement (Eqn. (VIII.2)) translates to
log
˜c
P
τ
´
c
ω
τ
¸
“1
2
log
ˆ
1
2
` P
N
˙
´ β0. (VIII.4)
For large SNR and covering-good Λ (such that ω « τ ), Eqn. (VIII.4) implies that τ « N , i.e., reffpΛq «
?
nN .
Note that scaling does not change covering goodness since rcovpΛq and reffpΛq (and rpackpΛq) are scaling homogeneous,
i.e., rcovpaΛq “ areffpΛq, reffpaΛq “ areffpΛq for any a ą 0.
Let ε1n ą 0 be a function such that εn nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0 and the decaying speed is lower than that of fpnq ´ 1 (by Lemma 27,
we know that fpnq ´ 1 ą 0 and fpnq ´ 1 nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0). Then, by Lemma 27, w.h.p. a random lattice from the above ensemble
satisfies
rcovpΛq
reffpΛq “
?
nω?
nτ
“aω{τ “ 1` ε1n,
or ω{τ “ 1` εn, for εn :“ 2ε1n ` ε12n Ñ 0.
Over the randomness of picking q-ary linear codes, it was shown in [ZV19] that the infinite lattice Λ is list decodable.
Lemma 28 ([ZV19]). Let Λ be a lattice randomly drawn from the ensemble defined above whose parameters are restricted
as follows. Let
q :“
a
P {N
2β{8 ´ 1 .
Let reffpΛq ě
?
nN2β . Then Λ is p rP 1, rN 1, Lq-list decodable w.h.p.,
1
n
log Pr
G
”
Λ is not p rP 1, rN 1, Lq-list decodableı ď´ 5
8
β
logL
log q
` logp5qq ă 0,
where rP 1 and rN 1 are given by Eqn. (VIII.52) and Eqn. (VIII.51), respectively, and L :“ 2Op 1β log2 1β q.
Remark 4. If we take reffpΛq “
?
nN2β , then the density of Λ is
RpΛq “ 1
VolpΛq
“ 1Bn preffpΛqq
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— 1
1?
pin
p2pie{nqn{2 reffpΛqn
—
?
pin
p2pieN22βqn{2
.
Hence pN,Lq-list decodable lattices can achieve NLD
RpΛq “ 1
n
log
?
pin
p2pieN22βqn{2
“ log
?
pin
n
` 1
2
log
1
2pieN22β
nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ1
2
log
1
2pieN
´ β,
and list size L “ 2Op 1β log2 1β q.
Remark 5. For small constant β ą 0, q scales as Op1{βq and k scales as O
´
n{ log 1β
¯
. Our choice of parameters falls into
the regime specified in Lemma 27 after proper scaling.
Remark 6. Roughly speaking,
rP 1 «p2P ´Nq2
4P
, rN 1 « 2NP ´N2
2P
.
Note that, by setting α “ N2P , they can be written as rP 1 « p1´αq2P and rN 1 « N ´ 2α2P . In fact, the list-decoding capacity
1
2 log
rP 1ĂN 1 ´ β happen to equal the two-way adversarial channel capacity 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘´ β2´ β3´ β under the above choices
of rP 1 and rN 1. This coincidence matches our intuition in Sec. VII.
By union bound, w.h.p. a random lattice from the above ensemble is simultaneously good for covering and p rP 1, rN 1, Lq-list
decodable. Fix Λ to be any of such lattice.
Given two identical copies of C, independently expurgate them and get CA and CB as Alice’s and Bob’s codebooks,
respectively. Specifically, each codeword in C is independently picked into CA with probability 2´γn for certain sufficiently
small constant γ ą 0. Bob’s codebook CB is obtained in the same manner independently. By Chernoff bound (Corollary 13),
we have that |CA| and |CB | are at least 12 ¨ 2
1
2 logp 12` PN q´β0´γ with probability doubly exponentially close to 1. The rate incurs
essentially no loss if γ is sufficiently small.
Remark 7. In the proof in subsequent sections, the probability is only taken over message selection mA „M,m „ W and
the expurgation process. The base lattice Λ is fixed throughout the paper.
B. Error events
Take a
?
nη1-net S of Bn `0,?nN˘ such that for every s P Bn `0,?nN˘, there is s1 P S satisfying }s´ s1}2 ď ?nη1. We
can take a lattice ΛS of covering radius
?
nη1. If ΛS is good for covering, then the size of the net S is at most
|S| “
ˇˇˇ
Bn
´
0,
?
nN
¯
X ΛS
ˇˇˇ
ďVol
`Bn `?nN `?nη1˘˘
Vol
`Bn `?nη1˘˘
“
˜d
N
η1
` 1
¸n
“
ˆ
1
η1
˙Opnq
.
Elen The transmitted xA or xB is not close to the surface of the codebook,
Elen :“
!
}xA}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζ1q
)
Y
!
}xB}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζ1q
)
. (VIII.5)
Eip The transmitted codewords xA and xB are not approximately orthogonal,
Eip :“t|xxA,xBy| ě nPζ1u . (VIII.6)
Ez The sum of transmitted codeword pair xA and xB has length deviating from its typical value
?
2nP ,
Ez :“
!
}z}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
)
. (VIII.7)
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EsK The norm of }sK}2 deviates from its typical value
a
n rN “anpN ´ 2α2P q,
EsK :“
!
}sK}2 R
a
npN ´ 2α2P p1˘ δqq
)
. (VIII.8)
E The union of Elen, Eip and Ez , i.e., the transmitted xA and xB are not jointly typical,
E :“Elen Y Eip Y Ez. (VIII.9)
E‘ Given James’ received z, there is not a large number of pairs of codewords pxA,xBq such that xA ` xB “ z.
E‘ :“
!
|tpxA, xBq P CA ˆ CB : xA ` xB “ zu| ď 2npF1´op1qq
)
. (VIII.10)
ET Codeword pairs pxA,xBq which sum up to z are not in a thin strip T which will be defined later,
ET :“txA R T u Y txB R T u . (VIII.11)
E1 Codewords xA or xB in the strip have norm much less than
?
nP ,
E1 :“
!
}xA}2 ď
a
npP ´ c2q
)
Y
!
}xB}2 ď
a
npP ´ c2q
)
. (VIII.12)
E2 Codeword pairs pxA,xBq in the strip T that sum up to James’ observation z are not approximately orthogonal,
E2 :“t|xxA,xBy| ě nPθu . (VIII.13)
E3 Codewords xA or xB in the strip T are not approximately orthogonal to sK,
E3 :“t|xxA, sKy| ě nζu . (VIII.14)
Here sK “ projzKpsq is the projection of s to the subspace orthogonal to z.
E 1 The union of E1, E2 and E3, i.e., codewords xA, xB in the strip T and any given sK are not jointly typical,
E 1 –E1 Y E2 Y E3. (VIII.15)
Eα Bob’ estimate pα is imprecise w.r.t. the true value α used by James,
Eα :“tpα R α˘ ξu . (VIII.16)
Here α is the fractional length of s along the direction of z, i.e.,
››projzpsq››2 “ α }z}2
Edec-rad Bob’s estimate of decoding radius w.r.t. the effective channel deviates from its typical value
a
n rN .
Edec-rad :“
!
}xsK}2 Ran pN ´ 2α2P p1¯ δq ˘ µq) . (VIII.17)
Eavg-rad The (normalized) effective decoding radius deviates from its typical value (averaged over the strip) rPĂNrP`ĂN .
Eavg-rad :“
#pr R rP rNrP ` rN ˘ ν
+
. (VIII.18)
The dependencies among the above events are plotted in Fig. 2, where an arrow Ei Ñ Ej from event Ei to event Ej denotes
the inclusion Ei Ď Ej . We would like to point out that most “good” events are implied purely by Ecz . The proofs mostly follow
from geometric arguments.
In Sec. VIII-C, event Elen is analyzed in Lemma 29, Eip in Lemma 30 and 31, Ez in Lemma 32, and EsK in Corollary 33. In
Sec. VIII-D, the event E‘ is analyzed in Lemma 34, ET in Lemma 35, E2 in Lemma 36 and Corollary 37, E1 in Corollary 38,
E3 in Lemma 39, and Eα in Lemma 40. In Sec. VIII-E, the event Edec-rad is analyzed in Lemma 41 and Corollary 42. In Sec.
VIII-G, the event Eavg-rad is analyzed in Lemma 43. Finally, the average probability of decoding error is bounded in Lemma
45 in Sec. VIII-I.
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Fig. 2: Event dependencies. An arrow Ei Ñ Ej denotes the inclusion Ei Ď Ej . Events are defined in Sec. VIII-B.
C. Sumset property
For notational convenience, we write reff “ reffpΛq and rcov “ rcovpΛq.
Lemma 29. A lattice point chosen uniformly from C is concentrated within a thin shell near the sphere w.h.p. For any constant
ζ P p0, 1q,
Pr
x„C
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζq
ı
ď
˜a
P p1´ ζq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Proof.
Pr
x„C
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζq
ı
“
ˇˇˇ
ΛX Bnp0,anP p1´ ζqqˇˇˇˇˇ
ΛX Bnp0,?nP qˇˇ
ď
Vol
´
Bn
´
0,
a
nP p1´ ζq ` rcov
¯¯
Vol
`Bn `0,?nP ´ rcov˘˘
“
˜a
nP p1´ ζq ` rcov?
nP ´ rcov
¸n
“
˜a
P p1´ ζq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Lemma 30. For any vector v P Sn´1p0,?nP q, a lattice point uniformly drawn from C is almost orthogonal to v w.h.p. For
any constant ζ P p0, 1q,
Pr
x„C
“ˇˇ
cos=x,v
ˇˇ ě ζ‰ ď2˜aP p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Proof. Let B :“ Bnp0,?nP q. Define
B1 :“
 
x P B : cos=x,v ě ζ
(
,
B1 :“
 
x P B : cos=x,v ď ´ζ
(
.
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Fig. 3: A random lattice point in a ball is approximately orthogonal to any given vector v with high probability.
Geometrically (Fig. 3), B1 and B2 are the blue and pink cones restricted to the ball B. Then
Pr
“ˇˇ
cos=x,v
ˇˇ ě ζ‰ “ |ΛX pB1 Y B2q||ΛX B| . (VIII.19)
We apply Lemma 20 to upper bound the numerator and lower bound the denominator. To this end, we only need to upper
bound the volume of {B1 Y B2 which is at most 2 Volp pB1q.
2 Volp pB1q ď2 Vol´Bn ´anP p1´ ζ2q ` rcov¯¯ .
The probability in Eqn. (VIII.19) is hence at most
2 Volp pB1q
Volp qBq
“ 2 Volp pB1q
Vol
`Bn `?nP ´ rcov˘˘
ď2
˜a
nP p1´ ζ2q ` rcov?
nP ´ rcov
¸n
“2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Lemma 31. If xA and xB are two lattice points independently and uniformly chosen from C, then their inner product is close
to 0 w.h.p. For any constant ζ P p0, 1q,
Pr
xA,xB
i.i.d.„ C
r|xxA,xBy| ě nPζs ď2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Proof.
Pr r|xxA,xBy| ě nPζs “Pr
“}xA}2 ¨ }xB}2 ¨ ˇˇcos=xA,xB ˇˇ ě nPζ‰
ďPr “nP ¨ ˇˇcos=xA,xB ˇˇ ě nPζ‰
“Pr “ˇˇcos=xA,xB ˇˇ ě ζ‰
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ď2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
,
where the last inequality is by Lemma 30.
Lemma 32. Let xA,xB be random lattice points sampled uniformly and independently from C. Then z :“ xA`xB has norm
approximately
?
2nP w.h.p. For any constant δ P p0, 1q, λ P p0, δq, let ζ :“ δ ´ λ. Then
Pr
xA,xB
i.i.d.„ C
”
}z}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
ď2
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
,
Proof.
Pr
”
}z}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
“Pr
”
}xA ` xB}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
“Pr
”
}xA}2 ď
a
nP p1´ λq or }xB}2 ď
a
nP p1´ λq
ı
` Pr
”
}xA ` xB}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq, }xA}2 P p
a
nP p1´ λq,?nP s, }xB}2 P p
a
nP p1´ λq,?nP s
ı
.
The first term, by Lemma 29, is at most
Pr
”
}xA}2 ď
a
nP p1´ λq
ı
` Pr
”
}xB}2 ď
a
nP p1´ λq
ı
ď2
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
. (VIII.20)
The second term is at most
Pr
”
}xA}22 ` }xB}22 ` 2 xxA,xBy R 2nP p1˘ δq, }xA}22 P pnP p1´ λq, nP s, }xB}22 P pnP p1´ λq, nP s
ı
ďPr r2nP ` 2 xxA,xBy ą 2nP p1` δq or 2nP p1´ ζq ` 2 xxA,xBy ă 2nP p1´ δqs
ďPr rxxA,xBy ą nPδ or xxA,xBy ă ´nP pδ ´ λqs
ďPr r|xxA,xBy| ą nP pδ ´ λqs
ď2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
. (VIII.21)
Combining bounds (VIII.20) and (VIII.21) allows us to conclude
Pr
”
}z}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
ď2
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Corollary 33. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Let xA and xB be two random lattice points independently and uniformly sampled
from C. Let z :“ xA`xB and sK :“ projzKpsq. Then the norm of sK is concentrated around
a
npN ´ 2α2P q w.h.p. For any
δ P p0, 1q,
Pr
xA,xB
i.i.d.„ C
”
}sK}2 R
a
npN ´ 2α2P p1˘ δqq
ı
ď2
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
Proof.
Pr
xA,xB
i.i.d.„ C
”
}sK}22 R npN ´ 2α2P p1˘ δqq
ı
“Pr
”
}s}22 ´ α2 }z}22 R npN ´ 2α2P p1˘ δqq
ı
“Pr
”
}z}22 R 2nP p1˘ δq
ı
ď2
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 2
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
.
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D. Estimating α
Lemma 34. For any z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq, there is a large number of pairs pxA, xBq P C ˆ C which sum
up to z,
|tpxA, xBq P C ˆ C : xA ` xB “ zu| ěC1 ¨ 2
n
2 plogpP {2´cω,δq`log 1τ q,
where C1 “ C1pP q and cω,δ are positive constants to be defined later. In particular cω,δ ω,δÑ0ÝÝÝÝÑ 0.
Remark 8. For future convenience, let F1 ą 0 be the largest constant such that
2npF1´op1qq ďC1 ¨ 2n2 plogpP {2´cω,δq`log 1τ q.
It suffices to take
F1 :“1
2
log
ˆ
P
2
´ cω,δ
˙
` 1
2
log
1
τ
.
Note that F1
τÑ0ÝÝÝÑ 8.
Remark 9. For readers who are familiar with the myopic channel model [ZVJS18b], we would like to take this opportunity
to point out that, as opposed to the myopic case where the uncertain codewords from James’ perspective are approximately
uniformly distributed in his uncertainty set (which was named an oracle-given set of thickness only Opplog nq{nq), in our case
the uncertain codewords are exactly uniformly distributed on UFOX Λ given James’ observation z.
Proof. First note that for each xA P C, there is a unique xB P C such that xA ` xB “ z. Indeed, such an xB is given by
xB “ z ´ xA. Hence, to count
tpxA, xBq P C ˆ C : xA ` xB “ zu,
it is equivalent to count
txA P C : z ´ xA P Cu “ txA P C : xA P ´C ` zu
“ txA P C : xA P C ` zu (VIII.22)
“
!
xA P Λ: xA P Bn
´
0,
?
nP
¯
X Bn
´
z,
?
nP
¯)
, (VIII.23)
where Equality (VIII.22) follows from symmetry of lattice, i.e., x P Λ iff ´x P Λ for any x P Rn, and Equality (VIII.23)
follows from translation invariance of lattice, i.e., x` Λ “ Λ for any x P Λ. See Fig. 4. Define
UFO :“Bn
´
0,
?
nP
¯
X Bn
´
z,
?
nP
¯
.
See Fig. 5b for a real UFO (if it exists).
The number of xA in the UFO is at least
Vol
`}UFO˘
VolpΛq “
1
VolpΛq Vol
ˆ ­Bn ´0,?nP¯X ­Bn ´z,?nP¯˙
ě 1
VolpΛq Vol
`Bn´1 `r1˘˘ (VIII.24)
—
?
n?
2pireff
¨˝b
p?nP ´ rcovq2 ´ }z}22 {4
reff
‚˛n´1
ě
?
n?
2pireff
¨˝b
nP {2` r2cov ´ 2rcov
?
nP ´ nPδ{2
reff
‚˛n´1
“ 1?
2piτ
˜
P {2` ω ´ 2?Pω ´ Pδ{2
τ
¸n´1
2
(VIII.25)
“C1 ¨ 2n2 plogpP {2´cω,δq`log 1τ q, (VIII.26)
where we defined
r1 :“
c´?
nP ´ rcov
¯2 ´ }z}22 {4,
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Fig. 4: For any z P C ` C, the pairs of codewords pxA, xBq P C ˆ C that sum up to z lie within a UFO (the green and yellow
regions). If }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq, then the number of such pairs is exponentially large.
C1 :“ 1b
2pipP {2` ω ´ 2?Pω ´ Pδ{2q
ď 1a
7pP {2` 1q ,
cω,δ :“2
?
Pω ´ ω ` Pδ{2
in Eqn. (VIII.24) and (VIII.26), respectively.
Lemma 35. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Among those pairs
tpxA, xBq P C ˆ C : xA ` xB “ zu ,
most are in a thin strip T (to be precisely defined in the proof) of radius approximately anP {2 perpendicular to z,
|ΛX T |
|ΛX UFO| ě1´ ppnq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ρq ` c3,ω
P {2´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
´ C2
ˆ
P {2´ cε ` c4,ω
P {2´ cω,δ
˙n´1
2
,
where
ppnq “ pε,ωpnq :“?nε` 2?nω,
21
C2 “ C2pP q ď6
´a
P {2` 1
¯
,
and cε, c3,ω and c4,ω to be defined later satisfy cε
εÑ0ÝÝÝÑ 0 and c3,ω, c4,ω ωÑ0ÝÝÝÑ 0.
Remark 10. For future convenience, take the largest constant f1 ą 0 such that
2´npf1´onp1qq ěppnq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ρq ` c3,ω
P {2´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
` C2
ˆ
P {2´ cε ` c4,ω
P {2´ cω,δ
˙n´1
2
.
Proof. We will show that the volume of UFO is concentrated around a thin strip T (to be defined momentarily) on the equator
of UFO, so are the lattice points therein.
We slice UFO into many layers each of height
?
nε for some small constant ε ą 0. Obviously, the layer with the largest
volume is the one in the middle, denoted by F . Formally F is defined as
F :“
´z
2
`
!
x P R : ››projzpxq››2 ď ?nε{2)¯X UFO
“
´z
2
`  x P R : |xx, zy| ď }z}2?nε{2(¯X UFO.
Note that the disk F has radius
r :“
b
nP ´ }z}22 {4, (VIII.27)
P
c
nP
2
p1˘ δq.
We further take a strip T around the boundary of F ,
T :“Fz
´
Bn´1
´
0, r
a
1´ ρ
¯
ˆ R
¯
,
where Bn´1 p0, r?1´ ρqˆR denotes an infinitely high cylinder of radius r?1´ ρ, centered around 0, along the direction of
z. See Fig. 5a for the construction of F and T . We emphasize that there are two thickness parameters associated to T : ρ —
(a) Strip T is defined as the thin pink band around the equator of UFO.
The blue region denotes a thin disk F .
(b) A real UFO (if exists).
Fig. 5: Strip T and UFO.
(normalized) thickness along the radius of F ; ε — (normalized) thickness perpendicular to the radius of F . We want to show
that there is a large (exponential) number of lattice points in T . To this end, it suffices to upper bound the number of lattice
points in UFO but outside T . Indeed, UFOzT consists of two parts:
FzT “F X
´
Bn´1
´
0, r
a
1´ ρ
¯
ˆ R
¯
,
which is the blue disk in Fig. 5a, and UFOzF which is the union of the upper and lower door of UFO. We now upper bound
the volumes of these two parts separately. For the first part FzT , we have
Vol
´zFzT ¯ ďVol´Bn´1 ´ra1´ ρ` rcov¯¯ `?nε` 2rcov˘
“Vn´1
´
r
a
1´ ρ` rcov
¯n´1 `?
nε` 2rcov
˘
ďVn´1
˜c
nP
2
p1` δqp1´ ρq ` ?nω
¸n´1 `?
nε` 2?nω˘ . (VIII.28)
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For the second part UFOzF , we have
Vol
´ {UFOzF¯ ď2Bn `r2 ` rcov˘
“2Vn
`
r2 ` rcov
˘n
. (VIII.29)
where
r2 :“
d´?
nP ´ rcov
¯2 ´ ˆ}z}2
2
`
?
nε
2
´ rcov
˙2
. (VIII.30)
Note that
r2 “
gffe˜nP ´ }z}22
4
¸
´
ˆ
nε
4
` }z}2
?
nε
2
˙
´ p2?nP ´ }z}2 ´
?
nεqrcov
“ar2 ´ npcε ` cωq
ěan pP {2´ c1q, (VIII.31)
where we define, for notational convenience,
cε :“ε
4
` }z}2
?
ε
2
?
n
,
ďε
4
`
c
P p1` δqε
2
ďε
4
`?Pε.
cω :“p2
?
P ´ }z}2 {
?
n´?εq?ω.
ď
´
2
?
P ´a2P p1´ δq ´ ?ε¯?ω
ď2?Pω,
c1 :“Pδ{2` cε ` cω.
Combining bounds (VIII.28), (VIII.29), (VIII.31) and (VIII.25), we have that the probability that a uniformly lattice point
in UFO falls outside T is given by
Pr
xPUFO rx R T s “
|ΛX pFzT q|
|ΛX UFO| `
|ΛX pUFOzFq|
|ΛX UFO|
ď
Vol
´zFzT ¯
Vol
`}UFO˘ ` Vol
´ {UFOzF¯
Vol
`}UFO˘
ď
Vn´1
´b
nP
2 p1` δqp1´ ρq `
?
nω
¯n´1
p?nε` 2?nωq
Vn´1
a
P {2´ cω,δn´1
`
2Vn
´a
npP {2´ c1q ` ?nω
¯n
Vn´1
a
P {2´ cω,δn´1
— `?nε` 2?nω˘˜ P2 p1` δqp1´ ρq `a2P p1` δqp1´ ρqω ` ω
P {2´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
(VIII.32)
` 2?2pi
´a
P {2´ c1 `?ω
¯˜P {2´ cε ´ Pδ{2´ cω ` 2apP {2´ c1qω ` ω
P {2´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
. (VIII.33)
Observe that in Expression (VIII.32),
c3,ω :“
a
2P p1` δqp1´ ρqω ` ω
ď2?Pω ` ω
in the numerator vanishes as ω Ñ 0; in Expression (VIII.33),
c4,ω :“´ Pδ{2´ cω ` 2
apP {2´ c1qω ` ω
ď?2Pω ` ω
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in the numerator vanishes as ω Ñ 0. Also, cω,δ in the denominator of both Expression (VIII.32) and (VIII.33) vanishes as
ω, δ Ñ 0. By taking ρ, ε " ω, δ, we can make the bounds (VIII.32) and (VIII.33) exponentially small in total. This finishes
the proof.
Lemma 36. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. All pairs of codewords xA, xB in T that sum up to z are almost
orthogonal,
cosp=x,x1q P
„
´δ, pρ` δqP ´ ρP p1` δq{2p1´ ρqP ` ρP p1` δq{2

.
Remark 11. It is easy to verify that pρ`δqP´ρP p1`δq{2p1´ρqP`ρP p1`δq{2 ą δ. For future convenience, define θ :“ pρ`δqP´ρP p1`δq{2p1´ρqP`ρP p1`δq{2 . The above
bound can be relaxed to
ˇˇ
cos=x,x1
ˇˇ ď θ.
Proof. We will show that any two points (not necessarily in Λ) x, x1 in T are almost orthogonal. Define
=maxT :“ max
x,x1PT XΛ
x`x1“z
=x,x1 , =minT :“ min
x,x1PT XΛ
x`x1“z
=x,x1 .
It turns out that, as depicted in Fig. 6a, for any x and x1 in T such that x` x1 “ z,
´ cosp=minq ď cosp=maxT q ď cosp=x,x1q ď cosp=minT q ď ´ cosp=maxq,
The extremal angles =max and =min are given by
cosp=maxq “
2
”
pr?1´ ρq2 ` p}z}2 {2q2
ı
´ }z}22
2
”
pr?1´ ρq2 ` p}z}2 {2q2
ı
“1´ }z}
2
2
2
”
r2p1´ ρq ` }z}22 {4
ı
“1´ }z}
2
2
2
”
p1´ ρq ¨ nP ` ρ ¨ }z}22 {4
ı (VIII.34)
P
„
1´ P p1` δqp1´ ρqP ` ρP p1` δq{2 , 1´
P p1´ δq
p1´ ρqP ` ρP p1´ δq{2

(VIII.35)
“
„
ρP p1` δq{2´ pρ` δqP
p1´ ρqP ` ρP p1` δq{2 ,
ρP p1´ δq{2´ pρ´ δqP
p1´ ρqP ` ρP p1´ δq{2

, (VIII.36)
and
cosp=minq “1´ }z}
2
2
2
”
r2 ` }z}22 {4
ı
“1´ }z}
2
2
2nP
Pr´δ, δs. (VIII.37)
Eqn. (VIII.35) follows since Expression (VIII.34) is a decreasing function in }z}2.
To see that =max and =min are indeed extremal angles, see Fig. 6a. For x and x1 in the strip T (i.e., the light pink region
in Fig. 6a) which sum up to z, they form a triangle ∆OO1A. We are interested in determining the maximum and minimum
possible angles between such x and x1. It is not hard to see that =x,x1 “ 180˝´=OAO1. Hence cosp=x,x1q “ ´ cosp=OAO1q
and it suffices to bound =OAO1. Let
=max :“max
APT =OAO
1, =min :“ min
APT =OAO
1.
For any apex A, all apexes A1s which are on the same circle determined by O, O1 and A give the same angle =OA1O1 “
=OAO1. Hence, without loss of generality, we focus on A which is on the radius of the strip T . Thereby, ∆OAO1 is isosceles:
OA “ O1A. Now it is easy to see that =min and =max are given by A and A, respectively in Fig. 6a.
The following corollary follows directly from Lemma 36.
Corollary 37. For z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq, codewords xA, xB P T such that xA ` xB “ z satisfy
|xxA, xBy| ď nPθ.
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(a) Extremal angles formed by vectors x, x1 P T such that xA ` xB “ z for some
z with }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. The blue pair px, x1q forms the minimum angle =minT
and the red pair px, x1q forms the maximum angle =maxT .
(b) Extremal angles and extremal lengths in the strip T (the pink
region). The blue region denotes F .
Fig. 6: Extremal angles and extremal lengths in the strip T (the pink region). The blue region denotes F .
Corollary 38. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Codewords x in T have length close to ?nP ,
}x}2 P
”a
npP ´ c2q,
?
nP
ı
,
where c2 “ c2pρ, εq satisfies c2 ρ,εÑ0ÝÝÝÝÑ 0.
Proof. Define
xmin :“ argmin
xPT
}x}2 .
From Fig. 6b, we get
}xmin}22 “r2p1´ ρq `
ˆ}z}2
2
´
?
nε
2
˙2
“
˜
nP ´ }z}
2
2
4
¸
p1´ ρq ` }z}
2
2 ` nε´ 2 }z}2
?
nε
4
“nP ´ nc2, (VIII.38)
where
c2 :“cρ ` c1ε,
cρ :“
˜
P ´ }z}
2
2
4n
¸
ρ
ďP
2
p1´ δqρ
ďP
2
ρ,
c1ε :“}z}2
?
ε
2
?
n
´ ε
4
ď
c
P p1` δq
8
ε´ ε
4
ď
?
Pε
2
.
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Lemma 39. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. If x is uniformly distributed in T X Λ,
then it is approximately orthogonal to sK w.h.p., where sK :“ projzKpsq,
Pr
x„T XΛ r|xx, sKy| ě nζs ď
2ppnq
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ζ 12q ` c3,ω
P
2 ´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
,
where ζ 1 :“ ζPN .
Remark 12. For future convenience, take the largest constant f2 ą 0 such that
2´npf2´op1qq ě 2ppnq
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ζ 12q ` c3,ω
P
2 ´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
.
Proof.
Pr
x„T XΛ r|xx, sKy| ě nζs “
|tx P ΛX T : |xx, sKy| ě nζu|
|ΛX T | . (VIII.39)
The set T 1 :“ T X tx P Rn : |xx, sKy| ě nζu is the intersection of two halfspaces (that are symmetric around z) and T . (In
Fig. 7, the pink region represents T and the red subset of T represents T 1.) The above probability (Expression (VIII.39)) can
be written as
|T 1 X Λ|
|T X Λ| “
|T 1 X Λ|
|UFOX Λ|
´
1´ |pUFOzT qXΛ||UFOXΛ|
¯
ě VolppT 1q
Volp}UFOqp1´ 2´npf1´onp1qqq .
We already have a lower bound on Volp}UFOq. We now upper bound VolppT 1q.
VolppT 1q ď2 ¨ Bn´1 `r3 ` rcov˘ ¨ `?nε` 2rcov˘
“2Vn´1p?nε` 2?nωqpr3 `?nωqn´1, (VIII.40)
where r3 is the radius of T 1 given by
r3
r
“
d
1´ cos2
ˆ
max
xPT =x,sK
˙
“
d
1´
ˆ
nζ
}x}2 }sK}2
˙2
ďa1´ ζ 12, (VIII.41)
where ζ 1 :“ ζPN . See Fig. 7 for the geometry behind the calculations. Therefore, by Eqn. (VIII.25), (VIII.30) and (VIII.40),
(VIII.41),
VolppT 1q
Volp}UFOqp1´ 2´npf1´onp1qqq ď2Vn´1 p
?
nε` 2?nωq
´
r
a
1´ ζ 12 `?nω
¯n´1
Vn´1
a
n pP {2´ cω,δqn´1
`
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq˘
“2 p
?
nε` 2?nωq
1´ 2´pf1´op1qq
¨˝
P
2 p1` δq
`
1´ ζ 12˘` 2bP2 p1` δq p1´ ζ 12qω ` ω
P
2 ´ cω,δ
‚˛
n´1
2
(VIII.42)
ď2p
?
nε` 2?nωq
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ζ 12q ` 2
?
Pω ` ω
P
2 ´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
“ 2ppnq
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
˜
P
2 p1` δqp1´ ζ 12q ` c3,ω
P
2 ´ cω,δ
¸n´1
2
.
Note that by taking ζ " δ, ω, the above bound is exponentially small.
Lemma 40. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then pα is a good
estimate of α, i.e., pα P α˘ ξ, where ξ ě ζ ` p1´ αqpPθ ` c2q{P .
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Fig. 7: Most codewords in T are almost perpendicular to any sK which is assumed to be orthogonal to z.
Proof. By definition of estimator pα :“ 1´ xyB ,xBynP , it suffices to show AyB ,xBE « p1´ αqnP w.h.p. Note thatA
y
B
,xB
E
“xp1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK,xBy
“p1´ αq xxA,xBy ` p1´ αq }xB}22 ` xxB , sKy . (VIII.43)
By Corollary 37, if xA and xB that sum up to z fall into T , then they are approximately orthogonal |xxA,xBy| ď nPθ.
Moreover, by Corollary 38, their norms are concentrated around
?
nP , i.e., }xA}22 P rnpP ´ c2q, nP s and }xB}22 P rnpP ´
c2q, nP s. Also, for any given α such that projzps1q “ ´αz and the induced sK “ projzKps1q, we have |xxB , sKy| ď nζ w.h.p.
by Lemma 39.
Now we are ready to bound the estimation error of pα.
tpα P α˘ ξu “
$&%1´
A
y
B
,xB
E
nP
P α˘ ξ
,.-
“
!A
y
B
,xB
E
P nP p1´ α˘ ξq
)
“
!
p1´ αq xxA,xBy ` p1´ αq }xB}22 ` xxB , sKy P nP p1´ α˘ ξq
)
ĄEc1 X Ec2 X Ec3 . (VIII.44)
The last Inequality (VIII.44) follows since Ec1 X Ec2 X Ec3 implies
´p1´ αqnPθ ` p1´ αqnpP ´ c2q ´ nζ ďp1´ αq xxA,xBy ` p1´ αq }xB}22 ` xxB , sKy ď p1´ αqnPθ ` p1´ αqnP ` nζ.
By setting parameters properly, the above interval lies inside the interval nP p1´ α˘ ξq. Indeed, set ξ such that" ´p1´ αqPθ ` p1´ αqpP ´ c2q ´ ζ ě P p1´ α´ ξq
p1´ αqPθ ` p1´ αqP ` ζ ď P p1´ α` ξq ,
or "
ζ ď Pξ ´ p1´ αqpPθ ` c2q
ζ ď Pξ ´ p1´ αqPθ .
It suffices to set
ζ ďPξ ´ p1´ αqpPθ ` c2q,
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or
ξ ěζ ` p1´ αqpPθ ` c2q
P
.
E. Estimating effective decoding radius
The analysis in the previous section implies that pα :“ 1´ xyB ,xBynP is a good estimate to α used by James. It further implies
that, from James’ perspective, after Bob cancels his own (scaled) signal, Bob effectively receives
y
B
´ p1´ pαqxB “yB ´
A
y
B
,xB
E
nP
xB ,
which is approximately equal to p1´αqxA` sK w.h.p., where rxA :“ p1´αqxA is uniformly distributed in the strip scaled by
1´α. Such rxA’s are translated by sK (which is perpendicular to z) and Bob’s effective received vector is ryB :“ rxA`sK. The
geometry of the effective channel is shown in Fig. 8a. In fact, the effective decoding radius }sK}2 can also be well estimated
by Bob. Indeed, we have,
}sK}22 “
›››´y
B
´ p1´ αqxB
¯
´ p1´ αqxA
›››2
2
“
›››y
B
´ p1´ αqxB
›››2
2
` p1´ αq2 }xA}22 ´ 2
A
y
B
´ p1´ αqxB , p1´ αqxA
E
“
›››y
B
›››2
2
` p1´ αq2 }xB}22 ´ 2p1´ αq
A
y
B
,xB
E
` p1´ αq2 }xA}22 ´ 2 xp1´ αqxA ` sK, p1´ αqxAy
«
›››y
B
›››2
2
` p1´ αq2nP ´ 2p1´ αq
A
y
B
,xB
E
` p1´ αq2nP ´ 2p1´ αq2nP ` 0 (VIII.45)
“
›››y
B
›››2
2
´ 2p1´ αq
A
y
B
,xB
E
,
where Eqn. (VIII.45) heuristically holds w.h.p. Hence we equip Bob with the following estimator for }sK}2,
}xsK}22 “ ›››yB›››22 ´ 2p1´ pαqAyB ,xBE
“
›››y
B
›››2
2
´
2
A
y
B
,xB
E2
nP
.
Note that James does not have to use up all his power and thus }s}2 may be less than
?
nN . However, the worst case is
when }s}2 “
?
nN , which we assume is the case and suffices for upper bounding the decoding error probability. We now
bound the estimation error of }xsK}2.
Lemma 41. Fix z P C`C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then }xsK}22 P }sK}22˘nµ,
where
µ ě 2 max
"
c2p1´ αq2 ` ζ
2
P
` 2p1´ αqζp1` θq ` P p1´ αq2θp3` θq,
p1´ αq
ˆ
´c
2
2p1´ αq
P
` 2c2p1´ αqp1´ θq ` 3P p1´ αqθ ` 2ζp1` θq
˙*
.
Proof. By definition of the estimator, we have
}xsK}22 “ ›››yB›››22 ´ 2nP AyB ,xBE2
“}p1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK}22 ´
2
nP
xp1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK,xBy2
“}sK}22 ` p1´ αq2
´
}xA}22 ` }xB}22
¯
` 2p1´ αq2 xxA,xBy
´ 2
nP
´
p1´ αq2
´
xxA,xBy2 ` }xB}42 ` 2 xxA,xBy }xB}22
¯
` 2p1´ αq
´
xxA,xBy ` }xB}22
¯
xxB , sKy ` xxB , sKy2
¯
.
To simplify notation in the following calculations, define B :“ xxB , sKy {n. Then we claim that
Ec1 X Ec2 X Ec3 Ă
!
}xsK}22 P }sK}22 ˘ nµ) . (VIII.46)
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(a) The effective channel to Bob is ry
B
“ rxA ` sK. The pink band denotes
the scaled strip rT – p1´ αqT . (b) The average (over uncertain codewords rxA P rT ) effectivedecoding radius of Bob can be computed from the geometry.
Fig. 8: The geometry of the effective channel and the geometry of computation of average effective decoding radius.
Indeed, Ec1 X Ec2 X Ec3 implies
}xsK}22 ´ }sK}22
P
„
2p1´ αq2npP ´ c2q ´ 2p1´ αq2nPθ ´ 2
nP
`p1´ αq2 `pnPθq2 ` pnP q2 ` 2nPθ ¨ nP ˘` 2p1´ αqpnPθ ` nP qnζ ` pnζq2˘ ,
2p1´ αq2nP ` 2p1´ αq2nPθ ´ 2
nP
`p1´ αq2 `pnpP ´ c2qq2 ´ 2nPθ ¨ npP ´ c2q˘´ 2p1´ αqpnPθ ` nP qnζ˘ .
By taking proper values of parameters, the above interval is inside the interval r´nµ, nµs. Indeed, we take µ such that"
2p1´ αq2pP ´ c2q ´ 2p1´ αq2Pθ ´ 2P
`p1´ αq2pP 2θ2 ` P 2 ` 2P 2θq ` 2p1´ αqpPθ ` P qζ ` ζ2˘ ě ´µ
2p1´ αq2P ` 2p1´ αq2Pθ ´ 2P
`p1´ αq2ppP ´ c2q2 ´ 2PθpP ´ c2qq ´ 2p1´ αqpPθ ` P qζ˘ ď µ , (VIII.47)
or
µ ě 2 max
"
c2p1´ αq2 ` ζ
2
P
` 2p1´ αqζp1` θq ` P p1´ αq2θp3` θq,
p1´ αq
ˆ
´c
2
2p1´ αq
P
` 2c2p1´ αqp1´ θq ` 3P p1´ αqθ ` 2ζp1` θq
˙*
.
Note that
EcsK X
!
}xsK}22 P }sK}22 ˘ nµ) Ă!}xsK}22 P n `N ´ 2α2P p1¯ δq ˘ µ˘) .
Hence by Corollary 33 and Lemma 41, we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 42. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Assume E 1c and EcsK hold. Then
James’ estimate }xsK}2 is concentrated around the typical value an rN of the correct decoding radius }sK}2, i.e., }xsK}2 Pa
npN ´ 2α2P p1¯ δq ˘ µq.
F. Setting the rate
Note that y
B
´p1´αqxB “ p1´αqxA`sK. Hence the effective channel is essentially ryB “ rxA`sK, where rxA :“ p1´αqxA.
To decode, Bob computes
y
B
´ p1´ pαqxB “yB ´
A
y
B
,xB
E
nP
xB
29
“p1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK ´ 1nP xp1´ αqxA ` p1´ αqxB ` sK,xByxB
“p1´ αqxA ` sK ´
˜
1´ α
nP
xxA,xBy ` p1´ αq
˜
}xB}22
nP
´ 1
¸
` xsK,xBy
nP
¸
xB .
The error terms are bounded as follows. ››››1´ αnP xxA,xByxB
››››
2
ď1´ α
P
Pθ
?
nP (VIII.48)
“p1´ αqθ?P?n,›››››p1´ αq
˜
}xB}22
nP
´ 1
¸
xB
›››››
2
ďp1´ αqpc2{P q
?
nP (VIII.49)
“p1´ αqc2?
P
?
n,››››xsK,xBynP xB
››››
2
ď ζ
P
?
nP (VIII.50)
“ ζ?
P
?
n.
Bob scales CA by 1´ pα and sets his (normalized) decoding radius to
rN 1 :“ ˆaN ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µ` p1´ αqθ?P ` p1´ αqc2?
P
` ζ?
P
˙2
. (VIII.51)
The power of rx1A :“ p1´ pαqxA is at least
p1´ pαq2pP ´ c2q ě p1´ α´ ξq2pP ´ c2q— rP 1. (VIII.52)
Define
β1 :“p1´ αqθ
?
P ` p1´ αqc2?
P
` ζ?
P
ď?Pθ ` c2 ` ζ?
P
.
Note that since c2 Ñ 0 as ρ, εÑ 0, we get that β1 vanishes as θ, ρ, ε and ζ all approach 0. Let CA operate at rate
RA “1
2
log
rP 1rN 1 ´ β
“1
2
log
p1´ αq2P ´ ξp2p1´ αq ´ ξqP ´ c2p1´ α´ ξq2
pN ´ 2α2P q ` 2α2Pδ ` µ` β21 ` 2
a
N ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µβ1
´ β
ě1
2
log
p1´ αq2P
N ´ 2α2P ´ β2 ´ β3 ´ β, (VIII.53)
where Inequality (VIII.53) follows from Corollary 9 by setting ε and δ in the corollary to
εÐξp2p1´ αq ´ ξqP ` c2p1´ α´ ξq2,
δ Ð2α2Pδ ` µ` β21 ` 2
a
N ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µβ1.
In Inequality (VIII.53), we also defined
β2 :“2ξp2p1´ αq ´ ξqP ` c2p1´ α´ ξq
2
p1´ αq2P
ď2Pξ ` 2c2p1´ αq2P , (VIII.54)
β3 :“22α
2Pδ ` µ` β21 ` 2
a
N ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µβ1
N ´ 2α2P
ď22Pδ ` µ` β
2
1 ` 2
?
N ` µβ1
N ´ 2α2P . (VIII.55)
Since c2
ρ,εÑ0ÝÝÝÝÑ 0 and β1 θ,ρ,ε,ζÝÝÝÝÑ 0, we have that β2 vanishes as ξ, ρ and ε approach 0, and β3 vanishes as δ, µ, θ, ρ, ε and ζ
all approach 0.
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For future convenience, let
Cα :“1
2
log
p1´ αq2P
N ´ 2α2P .
By the above configuration of parameters and by the choice of Λ in Sec. VIII-A, Λ, thereby C, is
´ rP 1, rN 1, L¯-list decodable,
where L “ 2Op 1β log2 1β q.
G. Computing average effective decoding radius
In this section, we argue that, for any s P Sn´1p0,?nNq, the radius of the decoding region is concentrated around its
typical value w.h.p. over James’ uncertainty in the strip T .
Define random variable r such that
radius
´
Bn
´ry
B
, }sK}2
¯
X Bn
´
0,
a
n rP¯¯ “ ?nr.
As shown in Fig. 8b, from the geometry, we have, on the one hand,
cos
´
=rxA,ryB
¯
“
Ary
B
, rxAE›››ry
B
›››
2
}rxA}2
“ xrxA ` sK, rxAy}rxA ` sK}2 }rxA}2 ;
on the other hand,
sin
´
=rxA,ryB
¯
“?nr{ }rxA}2 .
By pcos θq2 ` psin θq2 “ 1, we obtain
r “}rxA}22
n
¨˚
˝1´
´
}rxA}22 ` xrxA, sKy¯2´
}rxA}22 ` }sK}22 ` 2 xrxA, sKy¯ }rxA}22
‹˛‚.
Note that heuristically, w.h.p. r approximately equals
r « rP
¨˚
˝1´
´
n rP ` 0¯2´
n rP ` n rN ` 0¯n rP ‹˛‚
“ rP
¨˝
1´ rP 2´ rP ` rN¯ rP ‚˛
“ rP rNrP ` rN .
However,in reality, Bob does not have direct access to the parameters of the effective channel. From Bob’s perspective, the
input of the effective channel is rx1A “ p1´ pαqxA of power pP 1 and the effective channel noise is xsK1 which is perpendicular
to z of power rN 1. Let ry1
B
:“ rx1A `xsK1. Define random variable pr such that
radius
´
Bn
´ry1
B
,
››xsK1››2¯X Bn ´0,an rP 1¯¯ “ ?npr,
which is a robust version of r that takes estimation errors into account. We then argue that the above channel parameters are
close to the underlying typical values w.h.p.
Lemma 43. Fix z P C ` C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then Bob’s estimate
of the (normalized) average effective decoding radius pr is concentrated around the underlying typical value rPĂNrP`ĂN , i.e., pr PrPĂNrP`ĂN ˘ ν, where
ν ě max
#
ex ` p
rP ` e1 ´ exq2rP ` rN ´ cδ,µ ´ e1 ` es ´ ex ´ 2µ ´
rP 2rP ` rN , p rN ` cδ,µ ` esqp rP ´ exq ` 3p rP ´ exqe
1 ´ e12rP ` rN ` cδ,µ ` e1 ` es ´ ex ´
rP rNrP ` rN
+
.
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Here
cδ,µ :“ 2α2Pδ ` µÑ 0, as δ, µÑ 0,
ex “ expρ, ε, ξq Ñ 0, as ρ, ε, ξ Ñ 0,
es “ espθ, ρ, ε, ζ, µq Ñ 0, as θ, ρ, ε, ζ, µÑ 0,
e1 “ e1pζ, θ, ρ, ε, ξq Ñ 0, as ζ, θ, ρ, ε, ξ Ñ 0.
Proof. Let xsK1 “ sK ` es where es is an estimation error vector. To bound the norm of es, note that on the one hand
1
n
ˇˇˇ››xsK1››22 ´ }sK}22 ˇˇˇ ď 1n ˇˇˇ››xsK1››22 ´ }xsK}22 ˇˇˇ` 1n ˇˇˇ}xsK}22 ´ }sK}22 ˇˇˇ
ď
´
β21 ` 2
a
N ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µβ1
¯
` µ
ďβ21 ` 2
a
N ` µβ1 ` µ
—es.
On the other hand, the largest possible difference between }sK ` es}22 and }sK}22 isˇˇˇ
}sK ` es}22 ´ }sK}22
ˇˇˇ
“
ˇˇˇ
}sK}22 ` }es}22 ` 2 }sK}2 }es}2 ´ }sK}22
ˇˇˇ
“}es}22 ` 2 }sK}2 }es}2 .
Therefore we have
}es}22 ` 2 }sK}2 }es}2 ďes,
or }es}2 ď
?
nes. Similarly, since
1
n
´
}rxA}22 ´ ››rx1A››22¯ “ rP ´ rP 1
“p1´ αq2P ´ p1´ α´ ξq2pP ´ c2q
“c2p1´ α´ ξq2 ` Pξp2´ 2α´ ξq
ďc2 ` 2Pξ
—ex,
if we write rx1A “ rxA ` ex, then }ex}2 ď ?nex.
The average decoding radius computed w.r.t. Bob’s estimated channel parameters is
pr “››rx1A››22
n
¨˚
˝1´
´››rx1A››22 ` @rx1A,xsK1D¯2´››rx1A››22 ` ››xsK1››22 ` 2 @rx1A,xsK1D¯ ››rx1A››22
‹˛‚
“
››rx1A››22
n
¨˚
˝1´
´››rx1A››22 ` xrxA, sKy ` xrxA, esy ` xex, sKy ` xex, esy¯2´››rx1A››22 ` ››xsK1››22 ` 2 xrxA, sKy ` 2 xrxA, esy ` 2 xex, sKy ` 2 xex, esy¯ ››rx1A››22
‹˛‚.
By Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
|xrxA, esy| ďnap1´ αqPes ď naPes,
|xex, sKy| ďn
apN ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µqex ď naNex,
|xex, esy| ďn
?
exes.
Therefore
pr P rP 1
¨˚
˝1´
´
n rP 1 ˘ nζ ˘ n?Pes ˘ n?Nex ˘ n?esex¯2´
n rP 1 ` }xsK}22 ` npes ´ µq ¯ nζ ¯ 2n?Pes ¯ n?Nex ¯ n?esex¯n rP 1
‹˛‚ (VIII.56)
Ď rP 1
¨˚
˝1´
´
n rP 1 ˘ nζ ˘ n?Pes ˘ n?Nex ˘ n?esex¯2´
n rP 1 ` }sK}22 ` npes ´ µ¯ µq ¯ nζ ¯ 2n?Pes ¯ n?Nex ¯ n?esex¯n rP 1
‹˛‚ (VIII.57)
Ď rP 1
¨˚
˝1´
´
n rP 1 ˘ nζ ˘ n?Pes ˘ n?Nex ˘ n?esex¯2´
n rP 1 ` n rN ` npes ´ µ¯ µ¯ cδ,µq ¯ nζ ¯ 2n?Pes ¯ n?Nex ¯ n?esex¯n rP 1 ‹˛‚ (VIII.58)
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“
»—–´ rP ´ ex¯
¨˚
˝1´
´ rP ´ ex ` e1¯2´ rP ` rN ´ ex ` es ´ 2µ´ cδ,µ ´ e1¯´ rP ´ ex¯‹˛‚, (VIII.59)
´ rP ´ ex¯
¨˚
˝1´
´ rP ´ ex ´ e1¯2´ rP ` rN ´ ex ` es ` cδ,µ ` e1¯´ rP ´ ex¯‹˛‚
fiffifl .
Eqn. (VIII.56) follows since
1
n
´››xsK1››22 ´ }xsK}22¯ ďβ21 ` 2aN ´ 2α2P p1´ δq ` µβ1
“es ´ µ.
Eqn. (VIII.57) follows since }xsK}22 “ }sK}22 ˘ nµ. Eqn. (VIII.58) follows since }sK}2 P cn´ rN ˘ cδ,µ¯. In Eqn. (VIII.59),
we defined e1 :“ ζ `?Pes `?Nex `?esex.
We set ν such that the above interval is a subinterval of
” rPĂNrP`ĂN ´ ν, rPĂNrP`ĂN ` νı. Indeed it suffices to take$’’&’’%
rPĂNrP`ĂN ´ ν ď
´ rP ´ ex¯ˆ1´ p rP´ex`e1q2p rP`ĂN´ex`es´2µ´cδ,µ´e1qp rP´exq
˙
rPĂNrP`ĂN ` ν ě
´ rP ´ ex¯ˆ1´ p rP´ex´e1q2p rP`ĂN´ex`es`cδ,µ`e1qp rP´exq
˙ , (VIII.60)
or
ν ě max
#
ex ` p
rP ` e1 ´ exq2rP ` rN ´ cδ,µ ´ e1 ` es ´ ex ´ 2µ ´
rP 2rP ` rN , p rN ` cδ,µ ` esqp rP ´ exq ` 3p rP ´ exqe
1 ´ e12rP ` rN ` cδ,µ ` e1 ` es ´ ex ´
rP rNrP ` rN
+
.
H. Expurgation
By now, all lemmas are proved w.r.t. C without expurgation. All bounds are only over the randomness of message selection.
However, Lemma 22 shows that, if the expurgation parameter γ and the packing/covering radius parameters τ and ω are
sufficiently small, properties shown in previous sections continue to hold with probability doubly exponentially close to 1 over
the expurgation process of CA and CB . Specifically, invoking Lemma 22, we have the following post-expurgation versions of
the lemmas we have proved so far. We state them without proof.
Lemma 44. Suppose that γ, τ, ω are all sufficiently small. Then the following bounds hold. They are post-expurgation analogs
of (pre-expurgation) bounds on probability (over message selection) of Elen, Eip, Ez , and EsK .
Pr
CA
«
Pr
x„CA
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζq
ı
ą 3
˜a
P p1´ ζq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸nff
ď 2´2Ωpnq ,
Pr
CA,CB
»—– Pr
xA„CA
xB„CB
r|xxA,xBy| ě nPζs ą 6
˜a
nP p1´ ζ2q ` rcov?
nP ´ rcov
¸nfiffifl ď 2´2Ωpnq ,
Pr
CA,CB
»—– Pr
xA„CA
xB„CB
”
}z}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
ą 6
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 6
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸nfiffifl ď 2´2Ωpnq ,
Pr
CA,CB
»—– Pr
xA„CA
xB„CB
”
}sK}2 R
a
npN ´ 2α2P p1˘ δqq
ı
ą 6
˜a
P p1´ λq ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸n
` 6
˜a
P p1´ ζ2q ` ?ω?
P ´?ω
¸nfiffifl ď 2´2Ωpnq .
Fix z P CA ` CB such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Then the following bounds hold. They are post-
expurgation analogs of bounds on E‘, ET and E3. Events Ec1 and Ec2 are geometric consequences of the construction of the
strip T and will not be affected by expurgation.
Pr
CA,CB
„
|tpxA,xBq P CA ˆ CB : xA ` xB “ zu| ă 12 ¨ 2
npF1´2γ´op1qq

ď 2´2Ωpnq ,
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Pr
CA,CB
„ |tpxA,xBq P CA ˆ CB : xA ` xB “ z, xA P T , xB P T u|
|tpxA,xBq P CA ˆ CB : xA ` xB “ zu| ą 3 ¨ 2
´npf1´op1qq

ď 2´2Ωpnq ,
Pr
CA
„
Pr
xA„CAXT
r|xxA, sKy| ě nζs ą 3 ¨ 2´npf2´op1qq

ď 2´2Ωpnq .
Events Ecα, Ecdec-rad and Ecavg-rad follow from E 1c and EcsK and will be not affected by expurgation as long as E 1c and EcsK hold
after expurgation.
I. Bounding probability of error
Let Tgood (Tbad :“ T zTgood) denote the subset of T in which codewords induce typical (atypical) radii of decoding regions
under xsK1 assuming these codewords were transmitted. The probability that the transmitted xA falls into Tbad is exponentially
small. For those xA in Tgood, by list decodability, the number of codewords i n balls centered around any xA P Tgood of radiusa
n rN 1 is at most L. After expurgation with probability 1´2´γn, in expectation, the number of codewords in the decoding ball
is at most L2´γn. To get doubly exponential concentration (which admits a union bound over s1 P S), we invoke McDiarmid’s
inequality and show that with probability 1´2´Ωp2nq over expurgation, the fraction of codewords in Tgood that suffer decoding
errors (i.e., there exists another codeword in the decoding ball) is exponentially small, or, in 1´ 2´Ωpnq fraction of decoding
balls induced by codewords in Tgood, there will be no codeword other than the transmitted one that survived the expurgation.
The analysis is similar to that in [JL17].
For any vector x, define rx :“ p1´ pαqx. For any set V , let rV :“ p1´ pαqV . Let txiuMi“1 denote C.
Lemma 45. Fix z P C`C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq. Fix s P Sn´1 `0,?nN˘. Then the fraction of codewords codewords
in Tgood that may suffer decoding errors is exponentially small with probability doubly exponentially close to 1 over expurgation,
Pr
CA,CB
«
Prrx1A„ĆTgoodX rCA
“rx1A suffers a decoding error‰ ą 3L2´2nγ
ff
ď exp
ˆ
´ p1´ 1{Lq
2
4p1` pL´ 1q2´nγq2 2
np2F1´Cα´6γ`β2`β3`β´op1qq
˙
` exp
ˆ
´ 1
12
2npF1´γ´op1qq
˙
,
where the outer expectation is taken over expurgation and the inner one is taken over uniform distribution on ĆTgood X rCA.
Proof. For z P C`C such that }z}2 P
a
2nP p1˘ δq and xsK1 P Bn ´0,an rN 1¯, consider a directed graph GpC, CA, CB , z,xsK1q
with vertices V “ C. There is an edge xA Ñ x1A for xA ‰ x1A iff
1) xA P Tgood X CA (xA is not expurgated in the construction of CA);
2) xB :“ z ´ xA P CB (xB is not expurgated in the construction of CB); (Note that xB is guaranteed to be inside Tgood if
xA P Tgood.)
3) x1A P CA and
›››ry
B
´ rx1A›››
2
“ ››rxA `xsK1 ´ rx1A››2 ďan rN 1 (there is an rx1A P rCA confusable with rxA).
For xA uniformly distributed in Tgood X CA, the probability that it incurs a decoding error is given by the following ratio
|txA P Tgood X CA that suffers a decoding erroru|
|Tgood X CA| ď
fpGq
|Tgood X CA| ,
where
fpGq :“ |txA P G : out-degpxAq ą 0u| .
We first bound the denominator. Before expurgation, by Lemma 34, 35 and 39, we have
|Tgood X C| “ |T X C|
´
1´ 2´npf2´op1qq
¯
ě |UFOX C|
´
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
¯´
1´ 2´npf2´op1qq
¯
ě2npF1´op1qq
´
1´ 2´npf1´op1qq
¯´
1´ 2´npf2´op1qq
¯
(VIII.61)
.“2nF1 .
Since
E
CA
r|Tgood X CA|s “ |Tgood X C| 2´nγ ,
by Chernoff bound (Corollary 13), we have
Pr
CA
„
|Tgood X CA| ď 1
2
|Tgood X C| 2´nγ

ď exp
ˆ
´ 1
12
|Tgood X C| 2´nγ
˙
34
ď exp
ˆ
´ 1
12
2npF1´γ´op1qq
˙
. (VIII.62)
We then bound fpGq. To this end, let us compute the expected value of fpGq. Note that
fpGq “
ÿ
xAPTgoodXC
1txA P CAu1tz ´ xA P CBu1
!
Drx1A ‰ rxA, rx1A P Bn ´rxA `xsK1,an rN 1¯X rCA).
Now
E rfpGqs “
ÿ
xAPTgoodXC
Pr
CA,CB
”
txA P CAu X tz ´ xA P CBu X
!
Drx1A ‰ rxA, rx1A P Bn ´rxA `xsK1,an rN 1¯X rCA)ı (VIII.63)
“
ÿ
xAPTgoodXC
Pr
CA
rxA P CAsPrCB rz ´ xA P CBsPrCA
”
Drx1A ‰ rxA, rx1A P Bn ´rxA `xsK1,an rN 1¯X rCAı (VIII.64)
“ |Tgood X C| 2´nγ2´nγ
´
1´ `1´ 2´nγ˘L´1¯
ď |Tgood X C| 2´2nγ
`
1´ `1´ L2´nγ˘˘ (VIII.65)
“L |Tgood X C| 2´3nγ , (VIII.66)
where Equality (VIII.63) is by linearity of expectation, Equality (VIII.64) follows since CA and CB are obtained by independent
expurgation and each codeword is expurgated independently. Inequality (VIII.65) is by Fact 8.
Using Fact 8, we can also get a lower bound on E rfpGqs,
E rfpGqs “ |Tgood X C| 2´2nγ
´
1´ `1´ 2´nγ˘L´1¯
ě |Tgood X C| 2´2nγ
ˆ
1´ 1
1` pL´ 1q2´nγ
˙
“pL´ 1q |Tgood X C| 2
´3nγ
1` pL´ 1q2´nγ . (VIII.67)
We next argue that f is actually Lipschitz. Think the expurgation process as picking each codeword in C independently into
CA and CB with probability 2´nγ . Define, for i P rM s,
Xi :“1txi P CAu „ Bern
`
2´nγ
˘
,
Yi :“1txi P CBu „ Bern
`
2´nγ
˘
.
Note that all Xi’s and Yi’s are independent. Now f can be written as
fpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XM , Y1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , YM q “
ÿ
iPrMs
xiPT
1tXi “ 1u1tYji “ 1u1
!
Di1 ‰ i, rxi1 P Bn ´rxi `xsK1,an rN 1¯ , Xi1 “ 1) (VIII.68)
“
ÿ
iPrMs
xiPT
1tXi “ 1u1tYji “ 1u1
$’’’’’&’’’’’%
ď
i1‰irxi1PBnˆrxi`xsK1,?nĂN 1˙
tXi1 “ 1u
,/////./////-
“
ÿ
iPrMs
xiPT
Xi ANDYji AND
¨˚
˚˝˚˚
OR
i1‰irxi1PBnˆrxi,?nĂN 1˙
Xi1
‹˛‹‹‹‚, (VIII.69)
where in Equality (VIII.68), ji P rM s is such that xji “ z ´ xi, and in Equality (VIII.69), AND and OR are taken over F2,
but the summation is still taken over Z as usual. For any i, if we flip Xi, f can change by at most
|fpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Xi “ 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XM , Y1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , YM q ´ fpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Xi “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XM , Y1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , YM q| ďL,
since xi can lie in the lists of radius
a
n rN 1 of at most L codewords, corresponding to the third factor of the summand of
Eqn. (VIII.69). For any i, if we flip Yi, f can change by at most
|fpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XM , Y1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Yi “ 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , YM q ´ fpX1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , XM , Y1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Yi “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , YM q| ď1
since it only appears as the second factor in the summand of Eqn. (VIII.69). Therefore, Lippfq ď L.
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Now we can apply McDiarmid’s inequality (Lemma 16) to get a doubly exponential concentration bound on f .
Pr
CA,CB
„
fpGq ě 3
2
L |Tgood X C| 2´3nγ

ď Pr
CA,CB
„
fpGq ě 3
2
E rfpGqs

(VIII.70)
ď exp
˜
´2p1{2q
2E rf s2
2ML2
¸
ď exp
¨˚
˝´
´
pL´ 1q |Tgood X C| 2´3nγ1`pL´1q2´nγ
¯2
4 ¨ 2npCα´β2´β3´βqL2
‹˛‚ (VIII.71)
“ exp
˜
´ pL´ 1q
2 |Tgood X C|2 2´6nγ
4L2p1` pL´ 1q2´nγq22npCα´β2´β3´βq
¸
ď exp
ˆ
´ p1´ 1{Lq
2
4p1` pL´ 1q2´nγq2 2
np2F1´Cα´6γ`β2`β3`β´op1qq
˙
, (VIII.72)
where Inequalities (VIII.70) and (VIII.71) are by Inequalities (VIII.66) and (VIII.67), respectively; Inequality (VIII.72) is by
Inequality (VIII.61). The exponent of bound (VIII.72) can be made exponentially large by taking sufficiently small τ . Indeed,
observe that the exponent is at least
2F1 ´ Cα ´ 6γ ` β2 ` β3 ` β ě2F1 ´ Cα ´ 6
“ log
ˆ
P
2
´ cω,δ
˙
` log 1
τ
´ Cα ´ 6.
To make the exponent 2F1 ´ Cα ´ 6γ ` β2 ` β3 ` β positive, it suffices to take
τ ă 2´pCα`6´logpP2 ´cω,δqq.
Finally, combining Inequalities (VIII.62) and (VIII.72), we have
Pr
CA,CB
„
fpGq
|Tgood X CA| ě 3L2
´2nγ

ď Pr
CA,CB
„
fpGq ě 3
2
L |Tgood X C| 2´3nγ

` Pr
CA
„
|Tgood X CA| ď 1
2
|Tgood X C| 2´nγ

ď exp
ˆ
´ p1´ 1{Lq
2
4p1` pL´ 1q2´nγq2 2
np2F1´Cα´6γ`β2`β3`β´op1qq
˙
` exp
ˆ
´ 1
12
2npF1´γ´op1qq
˙
.
The proof of achievability can be finished by taking a union bound over s1 P S where |S| “ 2Opnq.
J. Improved analysis for sumset property
In this section, we show that one can get rid of the technical condition for sumset property that the covering radius of the
underlying lattice is small. We prove high-probability bounds over random lattice construction and message selection.
We use a random nested Construction-A lattice pair with fine lattice Λ lifted from a q-ary k-dimensional random linear code
and a coarse lattice Λ0 that is good for covering. Specifically, fix a coarse lattice Λ0 with rcovpΛ0q “
?
nP such that
rcovpΛ0q
reffpΛ0q “
?
nP
reffpΛ0q “ 1` ε
1
n,
for some ε1n
nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0. Choose k such that qk “ 2nR. Let G1 be a random matrix uniformly distributed in Fnˆkq . Define linear
code C1 generated by G1 as C1 – G1Fkq . Define the lattice Λ1 lifted from C1 via Construction-A as Λ1 – 1qΦpC1q ` Zn where
Φ denotes the natural embedding from Fq to Z. Rotate Λ1 using any generator matrix G0 of Λ0 and obtain the fine lattice
Λ – G0Λ1. Finally, define the nested Construction-A lattice code C as C – Λ X VpΛ0q. Let φ denote the encoding map
associated to C.
Lemma 46. For any ζ P p0, 3{4q and m P  1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 2nR(,
Pr
C
”
}φpmq}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζq
ı
ď2´npζ{2´4{q´ε1nq.
Proof. Let x – φpmq. By code construction, x is uniformly distributed in 1qΛ0 X VpΛ0q. Therefore,
Pr
C
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ζq
ı
“
ˇˇˇ
1
qΛ0 X Bn
´
0,
a
nP p1´ ζq
¯
X VpΛ0q
ˇˇˇ
qn
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ď
ˇˇˇ
1
qΛ0 X Bn
´
0,
a
nP p1´ ζq
¯ˇˇˇ
qn
ď Vn
VolpΛ0q
ˆa
nP p1´ ζq ` rcovpΛ0q
q
˙n
(VIII.73)
“VnrcovpΛ0q
n
VolpΛ0q
ˆa
1´ ζ ` 1
q
˙n
“Vol pB
n prcovqq
Vol pBn preffqq
ˆa
1´ ζ ` 1
q
˙n
“
ˆ
rcov
reff
˙nˆa
1´ ζ ` 1
q
˙n
“p1` ε1nqn
ˆa
1´ ζ ` 1
q
˙n
“2´n
´
log 1?
1´ζ`1{q´logp1`ε1nq
¯
ď2´npζ{2´4{q´ε1nq, (VIII.74)
where Inequality (VIII.73) is by Lemma 21. The last inequality (VIII.74) follows since
´ log 1?
1´ ζ ` 1{q ` logp1` ε
1
nq “ log
´a
1´ ζ ` 1{q
¯
` logp1` ε1nq
ď1
2
log p1´ ζq ` log
ˆ
1` 1
q
?
1´ ζ
˙
` 2ε1n (VIII.75)
ď´ ζ{2` 2
q
?
1´ ζ ` ε
1
n (VIII.76)
ď´ ζ{2` 4{q ` ε1n, (VIII.77)
where Inequalities (VIII.75) and (VIII.76) follows from Fact 7 and Inequality (VIII.77) is by ζ ă 3{4.
Lemma 47. Fix any ζ P p0, 3{4q. If m1,m2 are two uniform messages from
 
1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 2nR(, then
Pr
m1,m2,C
“ˇˇ
cos=φpm1q,φpm2q
ˇˇ ě ζ‰ ď2 ¨ 2´npζ2{2´4{q´ε1nq.
Proof. Let x1 – φpm1q,x2 – φpm2q. By the choice of m1,m2 and the code design, x1 and x2 are independent and
uniformly distributed in 1qΛ0 X VpΛ0q. For any x P V , define a cone Tx as
Tx :“
 
v P Rn : ˇˇ=x,v ˇˇ ě ζ( .
Now,
Pr
x1,x2,C
“ˇˇ
cos
`
=x1,x2
˘ˇˇ ě ζ‰ “ E
x1
»–
ˇˇˇ
1
qΛ0 X Tx1 X VpΛ0q
ˇˇˇ
qn
fifl
ď
ˇˇˇ
1
qΛ0 X Tx1 X Bn
`
0,
?
nP
˘ˇˇˇ
qn
(VIII.78)
ď
2
ˇˇˇ
1
qΛ0 X Bn
´a
nP p1´ ζ2q
¯ˇˇˇ
qn
(VIII.79)
ď 2Vn
VolpΛ0q
ˆa
nP p1´ ζ2q ` rcovpΛ0q
q
˙n
ď2 ¨ 2´npζ2{2´4{q´ε1nq,
where Inequalities (VIII.78) and (VIII.79) are illustrated in Fig. 9 and x1 in Inequality (VIII.78) can be taken to be any vector
in 1qΛ0 X VpΛ0q.
Similar to Lemma 31, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 48. Fix any ζ P p0, 3{4q. If m1,m2 are two uniform messages from
 
1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 2nR(, then
Pr
m1,m2,C
r|xφpm1q, φpm2qy| ě nPζs ď2 ¨ 2´npζ2{2´4{q´ε1nq.
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Fig. 9: In a random nested Construction-A lattice code, two random codewords are approximately orthogonal to each other
w.h.p. over lattice construction and message selection.
Similar to Lemma 32, we get sumset property using the Lemma 46 and 48.
Lemma 49. Fix any δ P p0, 3{4q, λ P p0, δq, let ζ :“ δ ´ λ. If m1,m2 are two uniform messages from
 
1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 2nR(, then
Pr
m1,m2,C
”
}φpm1q ` φpm2q}2 R
a
2nP p1˘ δq
ı
ď2 ¨ 2´npλ{2´4{q´ε1nq ` 2 ¨ 2´npζ2{2´4{q´ε1nq.
IX. CONVERSE
A. Scale-and-babble strategy
Our converse works even against stochastic codes which are defined as follows.
Definition 10. A stochastic code C is a code which can map a message to different codewords with certain probability.
Formally, the (stochastic) encoder of C is identified with a conditional distribution: for any m PM and any x P Bn `0,?nP ˘,
Pr rEncpmq “ xs “Px|mpx|mq.
It suffices to design a jamming strategy for James under which no rate larger than CA is achievable. As we shall see, the
strategy we are going to design and analyze will turn the adversarial channel into an AWGN channel of certain SNR. AWGN
channels are defined below.
Definition 11. An AWGNpP,Nq channel is a channel in which the channel input x P Rn satisfies }x}2 ď
?
nP and the
channel output is y “ x` g where g „ N p0, NInq.
Given any stochastic codebook pair pCA, CBq for a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel with
vanishing probability of error Pe,avgpCAq ď δn and Pe,avgpCBq ď δn where δn “ onp1q, we equip James with the following
jamming strategy which we call the scale-and-babble strategy.
For notational brevity, we write xA :“ xmA and xB :“ xmB . Let B :“ Bn
`
0,
?
nP
˘
.
Given James’ received vector z, define rs :“ ´αz` g “ ´αpxA ` xBq ` g for some α to be optimized later and
s “
#rs, if }rs}2 ď ?nN?
nN rs}rs}2 , otherwise ,
where g „ N p0, γ2Inq and γ2 “ N ´ 2α2P p1 ` 2εq for some small constant ε ą 0. Further define E :“
 }rs}2 ą ?nN(,
Q :“ Pr rEs and e :“ 1E . We will reveal the value of α to Bob and argue that even with such extra information available at
decoder, any pCA, CBq (possibly stochastic) is not able to achieve rate larger than 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
.
Under the above jamming strategy, when e “ 0, the channel to Bob is
y “xA ` xB ` s
“p1´ αqpxA ` xBq ` g.
Since Bob is assumed to know α, he scales and cancels out his signal p1´ αqxB , and gets effectively ry “ p1´ αqxA ` g.
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Note that we could assume that
E
xA„CA
rxAs “ 1M
ÿ
mAPM
ż
B
PxA|mApxA|mAqxA dxA “ 0,
E
xB„CB
rxBs “ 1W
ÿ
mBPW
ż
B
PxB |mB pxB |mBqxB dxB “ 0,
where the expectations are taken over distribution UnifpMq ˆ PxA|mA and UnifpWq ˆ PxB |mB , respectively. Otherwise,
assume E rxAs “ a ‰ 0 and E rxBs “ b ‰ 0. Hence every codeword can be decomposed as
xA “ x1A ` a, xB “ x1B ` b.
Note that E rx1As “ E rxBs “ 0. Since CA and CB , in particular a and b, are known to every party, James could set rs :“´αpz´ a´ bq ` g “ ´αpx1A ` x1Bq ` g. Conditioned on Ec, Bob receives
y “xA ` xB ` s
“p1´ αqpx1A ` x1Bq ` g ` a` b.
He cancels out a, b and p1 ´ αqx1B and the effective channel becomes ry “ p1 ´ αqx1A ` g, where E rx1As “ 0 and g is a
Gaussian, which is identical to the previous case.
B. Analysis
Lemma 50. Under the scale-and-babble strategy defined in Sec. IX-A, no code pCA, CBq (possibly stochastic) with vanishing
average probability of error for a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel can have rate larger than
1
2 log
`
1` PN
˘
. That is CA ď 12 log
`
1` PN
˘
and CB ď 12 log
`
1` PN
˘
.
Proof. To get an upper bound on RA, we decompose nRA using standard information (in)equalities.
nRA “HpmAq (IX.1)
“HpmA|eq ` IpmA; eq
ďPr rEcsHpmA|Ecq ` Pr rEsHpmA|Eq ` 1 (IX.2)
“Q pHpmA|ry, Ecq ` IpmA; ry|Ecqq `QHpmA|Eq ` 1 (IX.3)
ďQ `nεn ` IpxA; ry|Ecq˘`QnRA ` 1 (IX.4)
“Q `nεn `Hpry|Ecq ´Hpry|xA, Ecq˘`QnRA ` 1
“Q `nεn `Hpry|Ecq ´Hpg|Ecq˘`QnRA ` 1, (IX.5)
In the above chain of (in)equalities,
1) Equality (IX.1) follows since mA is uniformly distributed on r2nRAs.
2) Inequality (IX.2) follows since e is a binary random variable and IpmA; eq ď Hpeq ď 1.
3) In Eqn. (IX.3), ry denotes p1´ αqxA ` g.
4) Inequality (IX.4) is by Fano’s inequality and data processing inequality, since conditioned on Ec the effective channel to
Bob is an AWGN channel. We can take εn :“ RAδn ` 1{n “ onp1q.
5) Equality (IX.5) is justified below,
Hpry|xA, Ecq “Hpp1´ αqxA ` g|xA, Ecq
“Hpg|xA, Ecq
“Hpg|Ecq, (IX.6)
where Equality (IX.6) follows since g is a white Gaussian noise independent of everything else.
In what follows, we upper bound Hpry|Ecq and lower bound Hpg|Ecq separately. To bound Hpry|Ecq, note that, by
subadditivity of entropy,
Hpry|Ecq ď nÿ
i“1
Hprypiq|Ecq.
Each H
`rypiq|Ec˘ can be bounded using the principle of maximum entropy. Observe that Ec “  }rs}2 ď ?nN( truncates rs
at the boundary of the ball Bn `0,?nN˘, hence conditioning on Ec will not increase the variance of xA ` xB ` rs. Since
y “ p1´ αqpxA ` xBq ` g and ry “ p1´ αqxA ` g can be computed by Bob only when Ec happens, we have
E
“ rypiq2 ˇˇ Ec‰ ďE “rypiq2‰ .
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Now we compute
E
“rypiq2‰ “E ”`p1´ αqxApiq ` gpiq˘2ı
“p1´ αq2E “xApiq2‰` γ2. (IX.7)
Equality (IX.7) follows since gpiq is independent of xApiq and has mean 0, variance γ2. Now, by the entropy vs. variance
bound (Lemma 24),
H
`rypiq˘ ď1
2
log
`
2pieVar
“rypiq‰˘
“1
2
log
`
2pieE
“rypiq2‰˘ (IX.8)
“1
2
log
`
2pie
`p1´ αq2E “xApiq2‰` γ2˘˘ .
Equality (IX.8) follows since E
“rypiq‰ “ p1´ αqE rxApiqs ` E “gpiq‰ “ 0. Therefore,
H
`ry˘ ď nÿ
i“1
1
2
log
`
2pie
`p1´ αq2E “xApiq2‰` γ2˘˘
“1
2
log
˜
nź
i“1
2pie
`p1´ αq2E “xApiq2‰` γ2˘
¸
.
Since
řn
i“1 xApiq2 ď nP with probability 1, the above bound is maximized when each xApiq2 is equal to P . We have
H
`ry|Ec˘ ď 1
Q
H
`ry˘ ď 1
Q
n
2
log
`
2pie
`p1´ αq2P ` γ2˘˘ . (IX.9)
The term Hpg|Ecq can be bounded in a similar manner.
Hpg|Ecq ď
nÿ
i“1
Hpgpiq|Ecq
ď
nÿ
i“1
1
2
log
`
2pieE
“
gpiq2|Ec‰˘
ď
nÿ
i“1
1
2
log
`
2pieE
“
gpiq2‰˘ (IX.10)
“n
2
logp2pieγ2q, (IX.11)
where Inequality (IX.10) follows by noting
Ec “
!
}rs}2 ď ?nN)
“
!››´αpxA ` xBq ` g››2 ď ?nN)
“
!
g P Bn
´
αpxA ` xBq,
?
nN
¯)
,
and hence Ec restricts g to a (random) ball Bn `αpxA ` xBq,?nN˘ in which the variance of g can only be no larger.
Finally, combining the bounds (IX.5), (IX.9) and (IX.11), we have
RA ďQεn ` 1
2
logp2piepp1´ αq2P ` γ2qq ´Q
ˆ
1
2
logp2pieγ2q ´ 1
nQ
˙
`QRA ` 1
n
“1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
γ2
˙
` Q
2
logp2pieγ2q `Qεn `QRA ` 2
n
.
Rearranging terms, we have
RA ď 1
Q
1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
γ2
˙
` Q
Q
1
2
logp2pieγ2q ` εn ` 2
nQ
.
As shown in Sec. IX-C, Q “ onp1q. Substituting it back, we get
RA ď 1
2p1´ onp1qq log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
γ2
˙
` onp1q
1´ onp1q
1
2
logp2pieγ2q ` εn ` 2
np1´ onp1qq .
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Taking the limit as nÑ8, we have
RA — log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
γ2
˙
“1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
N ´ 2α2P p1` 2εq
˙
“1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
N ´ 2α2P `
p2αp1´ αqP q2ε
pN ´ 2α2P qpN ´ 2α2P p1` 2εqq
˙
.
Optimizing over admissible α and sending ε to 0 finishes the proof.
C. Bounding Q
Lemma 51. Q “ onp1q.
Proof. By definition of Q,
Q “Pr rEs
“Pr
”
}rs}2 ą ?nNı
“Pr
”››´αpxA ` xBq ` g››2 ą ?nNı
ďPr rE1s ` Pr rE2s ` Pr
”!
α2 }xA ` xB}22 `
››g››2
2
´ 2 @αpxA ` xBq,gD ą nN)X Ec1 X Ec2ı ,
where
E1 :“
 @´αpxA ` xBq,gD ą nη1( ,
E2 :“
!››g››2
2
ą nγ2p1` η2q
)
.
The first two terms are easy to bound. By Gaussian tail bound (Lemma 14), the first one is at most
Pr rE1s “Pr
“
g1 ą nη1
‰
ď exp
˜
´ pnη1q
2
2α2 }xA ` xB}22 γ2
¸
ď exp
ˆ
´ n
2η21
2α2 ¨ 4nP ¨ γ2
˙
“ exp
ˆ
´ nη
2
1
8α2Pγ2
˙
,
where g1 :“ @´αpxA ` xBq,gD „ N ´0, α2 }xA ` xB}22 γ2¯. As to the second term, by the standard tail bound of χ2-
distributions (Lemma 15),
Pr rE2s ď exp
ˆ
´η
2
2
4
n
˙
.
The last term is at most
Pr
„
}xA ` xB}22 ą n
ˆ
N ´ γ2p1` η2q ´ 2η1
α2
˙
“Pr
”
}xA ` xB}22 ą 2nP p1` εq
ı
(IX.12)
“Pr
”
}xA}22 ` }xB}22 ` 2 xxA,xBy ą 2nP p1` εq
ı
ďPr rxxA,xBy ą nPεs , (IX.13)
where in Eqn. (IX.12) we take η1 “ α2Pε{2, η2 “ α2Pε{γ2 “ α2PεN´2α2P p1`2εq . The probability in Eqn. IX.13 is onp1q by
setting η “ Pε in Lemma 52 as shown in Sec. IX-D.
All in all, we have
Pr rEs ď exp
ˆ
´ nη
2
1
8α2Pγ2
˙
` exp
ˆ
´η
2
2
4
n
˙
` onp1q
“ exp
ˆ
´nα
2Pε2
32γ2
˙
` exp
ˆ
´α
4P 2ε2n
4γ4
˙
` onp1q
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“onp1q.
That is, Q “ onp1q as promised.
D. Empirical properties of AWGN-good codes
To bound the probability (IX.13), we will prove certain empirical property that is universal for any capacity-achieving code
for an AWGN channel. To this end, we first define AWGN-goodness.
Definition 12. An infinite sequence of (possibly stochastic) codes tCnun, where Cn Ă Bn
`
0,
?
nP
˘
is equipped with encoder
Encn and decoder Decn, is said to be good for AWGNpP,Nq channels if
‚ for an arbitrarily small constant δ ą 0 and for all n, RpCnq ě 12 logp1` P {Nq ´ δ; and
‚ Pe,avgpCnq “ onp1q.
We then prove the following lemma which provides an onp1q bound on the probability (IX.13).
Lemma 52. Given any two (possibly stochastic) codes C1 and C2 that are good for AWGNpP,Nq channels, for any constant
η P p0, 1q, it holds that
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x1„C1
x2„C2
rxx1,x2y ą nηs “ 0,
where the probability is taken over x1 and x2 that are chosen according to the encoders of C1 and C2, respectively.
Proof. Suppose RpC1q “ 12 logp1` P {Nq ´ δ1 and RpC2q “ 12 logp1` P {Nq ´ δ2 for arbitrarily small constants δ1 ą 0 and
δ2 ą 0. Suppose C1 “ txiuiPrM1s and C2 “
 
xj
(
jPrM2s have probability of error εn and δn under their decoders Dec1 and
Dec2, respectively, when used over an AWGNpP,Nq channel. Since C1 and C2 are good, εn nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0 and δn nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 0. Let
M1 and M2 denote |C1| and |C2|, respectively.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists some constant ε ą 0 such that
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x1„C1
x2„C2
rxx1,x2y ą nηs “ 2ε.
Hence for infinitely many n that are sufficiently large, we have
ε ď Pr
x1„C1
x2„C2
rxx1,x2y ą nηs
“ E
x1„C1
„
Pr
x2„C2
rxx1,x2y ą nηs

“ E
m1„rM1s
«
E
x1„Px1|m1
„
Pr
x1„C2
rxx1,x2y ą nηs
ff
“ 1
M1
ÿ
iPrM1s
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px1|m1pζi|iq Prx2„C2
”A
ζ
i
,x2
E
ą nη
ı
dζ
i
.
By Markov’s inequality, there exists an i0 P rM1s such thatż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px1|m1pζi0 |i0q Prx2„C2
”A
ζ
i0
,x2
E
ą nη
ı
dζ
i0
ě ε. (IX.14)
Since Px1|m1pζi0 |i0q ě 0, by the first mean value theorem (Lemma 17) for integral, there exists an xi0 such that the integral
(IX.14) equals
Pr
x2„C2
“@
xi0 ,x2
D ą nη‰ ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px1|m1pζi0 |i0q dζi0 “ Prx2„C2
“@
xi0 ,x2
D ą nη‰ ě ε. (IX.15)
Define a halfspace
H “ Hxi0 ,η :“
 
x P Rn : @xi0 , xD ą nη( .
Define subcode C12 as C12 :“ C2 XH. Note that C12 is a subcode contained in the pink cap as shown in Fig. 10.
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For each j P rM2s, define
Zj :“
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px2|m2pξj |jq1Hpξjq dξj .
Note that Zj ď 1 for every j. It is not hard to see that C12 can also be written as
C12 :“
ď
jPrM2s : Zją0
 
xj P C2 : xj P H
(
.
The encoder of C12 is identified with the following conditional distribution: for every j,
P 1x2|m2pxj |jq “
1
Zj
Px2|m2pxj |jq1Hpxjq,
Let K be the size of message set of C12. Note that K “ tj P rM2s : Zj ą 0u. By Eqn. (IX.15),
ε ď 1
M2
ÿ
jPrM2s
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px2|m2pξj |jq1Hpξjq dξj
“ 1
M2
ÿ
jPrM2s
Zj
“ 1
M2
ÿ
jPrM2s
Zj1tZj ą 0u
ď 1
M2
ÿ
jPrM2s
1tZj ą 0u
“K{M2,
i.e., K ěM2ε.
Let xj˚ P Bn
`
0,
?
nP
˘
be such that
@
xi0 , xj˚
D “ η. (Note that xj˚ is on the boundary of the cap but it may not be a codeword
in C2.) Define θ “ =xi0 ,x˚j . Then, as shown in Fig. 10, we have
cos θ “
@
xi0 , xj˚
D››xi0››2 ››xj˚ ››2
ą nη?
nP
?
nP
“η{P.
Hence the radius
?
nP 1 the the cap can be computed as follows.˜?
nP 1?
nP
¸2
“psin θq2
“1´ pcos θq2
ă1´ pη{P q2.
We get P 1 ă P ´ η2{P ă P .
Now move the cap (together with codewords in it) so that its center becomes the origin. We get a new code C22 of the same
cardinality K as C12. Every codeword x2j P C22 satisfies
››x2j ››2 ď ?nP 1.
Equip C22 with the same decoder Dec2 as C2. We claim that when used over an AWGNpP 1, Nq channel, C22 also has
vanishing average probability of error. Indeed, first note that translating codewords does not change the pairwise distance,
hence Pe,avgpC22 q “ Pe,avgpC12q. (Here we use the same decoder Dec2 for C12 as well.) It suffices to bound Pe,avgpC12q. To this
end, define, for every m and xm,
Pepm,xmq :“Pr r pm ‰ m|m “ m, x “ xms
“ Pr
g„N p0,NInq
“
Decpxm ` gq ‰ m
‰
.
Then
M2δn “M2Pe,avgpC2q
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Fig. 10: Extracting subcode with large correlation. If an AWGN-capacity-achieving code is highly correlated on average, then
we can find a spherical cap among which all codewords have large correlation with the center of the cap. Furthermore, this
cap contains a constant fraction of codewords. Moving such a cap to the origin, we get a code of the same rate but lower
power. Used over the same channel, it still has vanishing error probability, which violates the fundamental limits.
“
ÿ
jPrM2s
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px2|m2pξj |jqPepj, ξjq dξj
ě
ÿ
jPrM2s : Zją0
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
ZjP
1
x2|m2pξj |jqPepj, ξjq dξj
ěZ˚
ÿ
jPrM2s : Zją0
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
P 1x2|m2pξj |jqPepj, ξjq dξj . (IX.16)
where in Inequality (IX.16), we let
Z˚ :“ min
jPrM2s : Zją0
Zj .
Note that Z˚ ą 0 is a constant independent of n. From Eqn. (IX.16), we get
Pe,avgpC1q “ 1
K
ÿ
jPrM2s : Zją0
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
P 1x2|m2pξj |jqPepj, ξjq dξj
ď M2
KZ˚
δn
ď ε
Z˚
δn
“onp1q.
Moreover, C22 achieves essentially the same rate as C2 which achieves the capacity of AWGNpP,Nq channels.
RpC22 q “RpC12q
“ 1
n
logK
ě 1
n
logpM2εq
“RpC2q ` log ε
n
nÑ8ÝÝÝÑRpC2q
δ2Ñ0ÝÝÝÑ1
2
log
ˆ
1` P
N
˙
.
However, the AWGNpP 1, Nq that C22 is used over has capacity 12 logp1`P 1{Nq ă 12 logp1`P {Nq. This violates the fundamental
channel coding theorem by Shannon and finishes the proof.
Finally, we list several straightforward corollaries of Lemma 52 that may be useful elsewhere.
44
Corollary 53. Given any (possibly stochastic) codes C1, C2 and C that are good for AWGNpP,Nq channels, for any constant
η P p0, 1q and k P Zě2, it holds that
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x1„C1
x2„C2
rxx1,x2y ă ´nηs “ 0, (IX.17)
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x1„C1
x2„C2
r|xx1,x2y| ą nηs “ 0, (IX.18)
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x,x1 i.i.d.„ C
“ˇˇ@
x,x1
Dˇˇ ą nη‰ “ 0. (IX.19)
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x1,¨¨¨ ,xk i.i.d.„ C
»——– ď
i,jPrks
i‰j
 ˇˇ@
xi,xj
Dˇˇ ą nη(
fiffiffifl “ 0. (IX.20)
Proof. Eqn. (IX.17) follows from the same argument as Lemma 52. Eqn. (IX.18) follows from a union bound that combines
Lemma 52 and Eqn. (IX.17). Eqn. (IX.19) follows by setting C2 “ C1 “ C in Eqn. (IX.18). Finally, since there are
`
k
2
˘ “ Onp1q
many distinct pi, jq pairs, Eqn. (IX.20) follows from Eqn. (IX.19) and a union bound.
Using similar ideas, we prove another empirical property that is universal to all AWGN-good codes, thought it is not used
in our main proof.
Lemma 54. Given any (possibly stochastic) code C that is good for AWGNpP,Nq channels, for any constant η P p0, 1q, it
holds that
lim sup
nÑ8
Pr
x„C
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ηq
ı
“0.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that for some constant ε ą 0
ε “ Pr
x„C
”
}x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ηq
ı
“ 1
M
ÿ
jPrMs
Zj ,
where we defined
Zj :“
ż
Bnp0,?nPq
Px|mpξj |jq1
!›››ξ
j
›››
2
ăanP p1´ ηq) dξ
j
,
for each j P rM s. Now define
C1 :“
!
x P C : }x}2 ď
a
nP p1´ ηq
)
.
By the same considerations as in Lemma 52, we have
‚ on the one hand, C1 has onp1q average probability of error when used over AWGNpP p1 ´ ηq, Nq channels which have
capacity 12 logp1` P p1´ ηq{Nq ă 12 logp1` P {Nq;
‚ on the other hand, the number of messages that C1 encodes is Mε, in particular, C1 achieves rate arbitrarily close to
1
2 logp1` P {Nq,
which is a contradiction.
E. z-aware symmetrization
Lemma 55. For a pP,Nq quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, assume N “ 3P p1 ` εq{4 for some
constant ε ą 0. Then any codebook pair pCA, CBq of sizes |CA| ě ε2p1`εq and |CB | ě ε2p1`εq has average error probabilities
Pe,avg,A ě ε4p1`εq and Pe,avg,B ě ε4p1`εq .
Proof. Given any codebooks CA and CB of positive rate, by similar considerations, we can assume without loss of generality
that E rxAs “ E rxBs “ 0, where the expectation is over xA and xB that are randomly chosen from CA and CB , respectively.
Define rs “ ´ 12 pz´ x1Aq “ ´ 12 pxA ` xB ´ x1Aq, where x1A is a random codeword from CA. Define s as follows.
s “
#rs, }rs}2 ď ?nN?
nN rs}rs}2 , otherwise .
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Define error events
E1 :“
!
}rs}2 ą ?nN) ,
E2 :“
 
xA “ x1A
(
.
Under the above jamming strategy, Bob receives
y
B
“xA ` xB ´ 12 pxA ` xB ´ x
1
Aq
“1
2
pxA ` x1Aq ` 12xB .
If rs satisfies power constraint, , cancelling his own signal, Bob effectively receives ry
B
“ 12 pxA ` x1Aq. If neither E1 nor E2
happens, then Bob has no way to distinguish between xA and x
1
A and the decoding error probability is at least 1{2 under any
decoding rule.
We now formally lower bound the probability of error under such a jamming strategy.
Pe,B “Pr r pmA ‰ mAs
ěPr rt pmA ‰ mAu X Ec1 X Ec2s
“Pr rEc1 X Ec2sPr r pmA ‰ mA|Ec1 X Ec2s
ě1
2
p1´ Pr rE1s ´ Pr rE2sq.
First note that Pr rE2s “ 1{|CA| which is at most ε2p1`εq as long as |CA| ě 2p1`εqε .
We next upper bound Pr rE1s. Suppose N “ 34P p1` εq. By Markov’s inequality,
Pr rEs “Pr
”
}rs}2 ą ?nNı
ď
E
”
}rs}22ı
nN
.
It suffices to upper bound E
”
}rs}22ı.
E
”
}rs}22ı “E
«››››´12 pxA ` xB ´ x1Aq
››››2
2
ff
“1
4
´
E
”
}xA}22
ı
` E
”
}xB}22
ı
` E
”››x1A››22ı` 2E rxxA,xBys ´ 2E “@xA,x1AD‰´ 2E “@xB ,x1AD‰¯
ď1
4
pnP ` nP ` nP ` 0´ 0´ 0q
“3nP {4.
Then we get that
Pr rEs ď3nP {4
nN
“ 1
1` ε .
Substituting the above bound back, we have
Pe,B ě1
2
ˆ
1´ 1
1` ε ´
ε
2p1` εq
˙
“ ε
4p1` εq .
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F. Some remarks
1) Using tools from [PV14], we are able to get a satisfactory bound on Q under maximum probability of error criterion.
However, such a criterion makes our problem much harder and less interesting. Indeed, by symmetry, let us consider
Bob. To make the maximum error probability large, James only needs to focus on one message. Said differently, we
can assume that James knows the message corresponding to the transmitted codeword. Under deterministic encoding,
this means that he knows the actual codeword xB from Bob. Given his observation z “ xA ` xB , he also knows xA.
Since Bob aims to decode the message corresponding to xA, James is essentially omniscient in this case. The problem
of determining the channel capacity of Bob collapses to the long-standing sphere packing problem. In fact [ZVJS18b],
even stochastic encoding does not help beat the sphere packing bound. As long as James knows the transmitted message,
there is a reduction from stochastic encoding to deterministic encoding which turns James omniscient again.
2) The effective channel to Bob who aims to decode xA is like a myopic adversarial channel if we treat xB as noise to
James. One difference is that the noise to James is known to Bob, which is usually not assumed in the myopic model.
3) In the general asymmetric case where PA and PB can differ, and NA and NB can also differ, following exactly the same
proof as in Sec. IX-E, we get that
‚ CB “ 0 if NB ą 2PA`PB4 ;
‚ CA “ 0 if NA ą 2PB`PA4 .
4) Empirical properties of good codes are not applicable in Sec. IX-E. If the channel is symmetrizable, the capacity is zero
and any code has subexponential size. It does not make sense to talk about capacity-achieving distributions, letting alone
empirical properties w.r.t. such distributions.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
This paper studies fundamental limits to a two-party message exchange problem over a two-way channel controlled by a
malicious adversary who has access to the sum of transmitted signals. We conclude the paper with some final remarks and
open questions for future research.
‚ Only in the high-rate regime, our upper bound due to scale-and-babble attack matches our lower bound based on expurgated
lattice codes and estimation-type decoder. Specifically, we require SNR to be a function (gpδq) of the gap-to-capacity δ.
We believe such a technical requirement can be relaxed to a condition that SNR ą K for certain universal constant
K (independent of δ). The can be potentially proved by bounding the error probability also over the random lattice
construction, e.g., via Construction-A.2 In this way, the technical requirement on SNR will be replaced by a large field
size q of the based code in Construction-A, which we are fine to afford.
‚ We do not believe that the constraint on SNR can be completely removed. Instead, we believe that in low-SNR regime the
capacity is strictly less than 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
. The intuition comes from our symmetrization result. The bound 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
is only valid when SNR ě 1{2 since otherwise it is negative. However, our z-aware symmetrization attack shows that no
positive rate can be achieved as long as SNR ď 4{3. The threshold 4{3 is larger than 1{2 at which the bound 12 log
`
1
2 ` PN
˘
is still strictly positive. Such a gap suggests that our bound may not be tight in the low-SNR regime. Understanding the
behaviour of capacity in the low-SNR regime remains an intriguing open question.
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APPENDIX A
LATTICE PRIMER
For a tutorial introduction to lattices and their applications, see the book by Zamir [Zam14] or the notes by Barvinok [Bar13].
If v1, . . . , vk are linearly independent vectors in Rn, then the set of all integer linear combinations of v1, . . . , vk is called
the lattice generated by the vectors v1, . . . , vk, i.e.,
Λ :“
#
kÿ
i“1
aivi : ai P Z
+
.
If G “ rv1 ¨ ¨ ¨ vks, then we can write Λ “ GZk. The matrix G is called a generator matrix for Λ. The generator matrix of a
lattice is not unique. The integer k is invariant for a lattice and is called the rank of Λ. In this paper, we only consider lattices
in Rn having rank n. It is obvious that Λ is a discrete subgroup of Rn under vector addition. It is also a fact that every discrete
subgroup of Rn is a lattice [Bar13].
2Indeed, one of the ingredients of achievability, the sumset property, has already been proved in Sec. VIII-J without imposing the constraint SNR ě gpδq.
However, we have trouble finishing the rest of the proof. The main challenge is due to dependencies among random lattice points inherently caused by
linearity.
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For any lattice Λ, it is natural to define the quantizer QΛ which maps every point in Rn to the closest lattice point, i.e., for
every x P Rn,
QΛpxq :“ argmin
yPΛ
}y ´ x}, (A.1)
where we assume that ties (in computing the closest lattice point) are resolved according to some arbitrary but fixed rule.
Associated with the quantizer is the quantization error
rxs mod Λ :“ x´QΛpxq.
For every lattice Λ, we define the following parameters:
‚ The set
PpΛq :“ tGx : x P r0, 1qnu,
where G is a generator matrix of Λ, is called the fundamental parallelepiped of Λ.
‚ The fundamental Voronoi region VpΛq is the set of all points in Rn which are closest to the zero lattice point. In other
words,
VpΛq :“ tx P Rn : QΛpxq “ 0u.
Any set S Ă Rn such that the set of translates of S by lattice points, i.e., tS`x : x P Λu form a partition of Rn, is called a
fundamental region of Λ. It is a fact that every fundamental region of Λ has the same volume equal to det Λ :“ |detpGq|,
where G is any generator matrix of Λ. The quantity det Λ is called the determinant or covolume of Λ (also denoted by
VolpΛq). It is a fact that det Λ “ VolpVpΛqq.
‚ The covering radius rcovpΛq is the radius of the smallest closed ball in Rn which contains VpΛq. It is also equal to the
length of the largest vector within VpΛq.
‚ The packing radius rpackpΛq is the radius of the largest open ball which is contained within VpΛq. Equivalently, it is half
the minimum distance between two lattice points.
‚ The effective radius reffpΛq is equal to the radius of a ball having volume equal to VolpVpΛqq.
Clearly, we have rpackpΛq ď reffpΛq ď rcovpΛq.
In the context of power-constrained communication over Gaussian channels, a lattice code is typically the set of all lattice
points within a convex compact subset of Rn, i.e., C “ Λ X B for some set B Ă Rn. Usually B is taken to be Bnp0,?nP q
or VpΛ0q for some lattice Λ0 constructed so as to satisfy the power constraint.
If Λ0,Λ are two lattices in Rn with the property that Λ0 Ĺ Λ, then Λ0 is said to be nested within (or, a sublattice of) Λ. A
nested lattice code with a fine lattice Λ and coarse lattice Λ0 Ĺ Λ is the lattice code ΛX VpΛ0q.
Lattices have been extensively used for problems of packing, covering and communication over Gaussian channels. For
many problems of interest, we want to construct high-dimensional lattices Λ such that rpackpΛq{reffpΛq is as large as possible,
and rcovpΛq{reffpΛq is as small as possible. A class of lattices that has these properties is the class of Construction-A lattices,
which we describe next.
Let q be a prime number, and Clin be an pn, kq linear code over Fq . The Construction-A lattice obtained from Clin is defined
to be
ΛpClinq :“ tv P Zn : rvs mod pqZnq P ΦpCqu,
where Φ denotes the natural embedding of Fnq in Rn. An equivalent definition is that ΛpClinq “ ΦpClinq ` qZn. We make use
of the following result to choose our coarse lattices:
Theorem 56 ([ELZ05]). For every δ ą 0, there exist sequences of prime numbers qn and positive integers kn such that if Clin
is a randomly chosen linear code3 over Fqn , then
Pr
„
rpackpΛpClinqq
reffpΛpClinqq ă
1
2
´ δ or rcovpΛpClinqq
reffpΛpClinqq ą 1` δ

“ op1q.
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